




Prison Incident Management Handbook



CORRECTIONS



Strengthening a country's capacity to develop, maintain and manage a viable, safe, secure and humane prison system is an integral part of sustainable, nationally-owned peace-building efforts and an important building block for preventing relapse into conflict. This *Prison Incident Management Handbook* is intended to provide guidance to United Nations corrections officers and other partners that assist national prison authorities in addressing the many prison security challenges. It provides a framework to maintain good order in prisons and exercise safe and humane control of prisoners.



Prison Incident Management Handbook

Foreword

Strengthening a country's capacity to develop, maintain and manage a viable, safe, secure and humane prison system is an integral part of sustainable, nationally-owned peace-building efforts and an important building block for preventing relapse into conflict. Prison authorities are often overwhelmed with challenges and, in an already fragile environment, the capacity of national authorities to prevent or effectively manage prison security incidents, such as mass escapes or riots, can significantly impact peace and stability.

United Nations corrections personnel deployed by the Department of Field Support (DFS) and the Department of Peacekeeping Operations (DPKO) assist host countries to address prison security gaps, overcrowding, infrastructure needs, and the water, food, health and sanitation requirements of prisoners. They also train national prison personnel and assist the authorities in the development and implementation of prison-related policies and procedures.

To support the activities of United Nations personnel in the field, the Criminal Law and Judicial Advisory Service of the DPKO Office of Rule of Law and Security Institutions has developed a growing body of operational policies, guidance materials and lessons learned studies. This Prison Incident Management Handbook, endorsed by DPKO and DFS, is intended to provide guidance to United Nations corrections officers and other partners that assist national prison authorities in addressing the many prison security challenges. It provides a framework to maintain good order in prisons and exercise safe and humane control of prisoners.

The publication of this handbook comes at a time when DPKO and the United Nations Development Programme have jointly assumed the responsibility of a Global Focal Point for the police, justice and corrections areas in the rule of law in post-conflict and other crisis situations. This new arrangement presents a unique and exciting opportunity for the United Nations to enhance the predictability, coherence, accountability and effectiveness of its assistance efforts in these areas.

We wish to express our deepest appreciation to all United Nations departments, agencies, funds and programmes who contributed to the development of this handbook.

In particular, we would like to recognize the contributions of United Nations corrections officers in the field for their perspectives, insights and shared experiences that shaped this handbook into a practical and user-friendly guide on managing prison security incidents.

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United Nations Under-Secretary-General
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Donor

This handbook would not have been possible without the generous funding provided by the Government of Canada. We are grateful for Canada's continued support to rule of law in peacekeeping missions.

Consultant

We thank Mr. Drury Allen, who over a period of two years worked closely with CLJAS and its key partners through an ongoing consultative process in the development of this handbook.

Contributors

The bulk of the development of this handbook was undertaken by United Nations DPKO staff. We recognize the valuable contributions from the corrections components of DPKO Missions, in particular BINUCA, MINUSTAH, MONUSCO, UNAMA, UNAMID, UNMIT, UNMIL, UNMISS, and UNOCI. We also want to thank the various OROLSI components who engaged in the process from gathering information to editing the final draft.

Reviewers

Finally, we appreciate all our partners who contributed their perspectives, ideas and comments. While all contributions were taken into consideration, the final product does not necessarily reflect all inputs for reasons of limitations to the specific technical theme on managing prison incidents and the related purpose of the handbook. Thanks to ICRC, OHCHR, UNDP, UNODC, and Penal Reform International.

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Introduction

This handbook has been prepared to assist corrections advisors on assignment with United Nations peacekeeping operations to advise national prison management on prison security and incident management. It includes principles, conceptual frameworks and suggestions to help mitigate and prevent mass escapes and prison disturbances in mission settings. The handbook provides suggested courses of action for corrections advisors and should guide discussions with prison management related to good order and control in the management of prison security.

It is based on extensive lessons learned from field missions in South Sudan, Liberia, the Democratic Republic of the Congo (DRC) and Haiti. Suggestions and knowledge gained from advisors in the field are highlighted in italics throughout the handbook. In addition, Annex 3 provides recommendations and suggested courses of action to address issues identified and raised during mission visits, based on observations by experienced corrections advisors.

The handbook was developed to address critical prison security challenges in post-conflict countries. A number of major prison disturbances or mass escapes have occurred in United Nations missions, some involving loss of life or serious injuries to prisoners, staff or members of the public. These incidents call into question the ability of a prison service to maintain good order and exercise control over prisoners, and the ability of the United Nations to support host countries and national authorities in their capacity to respond to security incidents.

The extent to which prisoners feel that they are treated as human beings, are kept informed, and know their rights, obligations and responsibilities affects the overall culture and climate of a prison. It also determines, to a large extent, the type of incident that occurs.

The causes of frequent prison disturbances and escapes include: blockages in the criminal justice system that give rise to prolonged pre-trial detention without any expectation of a future court appearance; overcrowding; gaps in organizational structure; not enough or poorly trained prison staff; poor conditions for prison staff; inadequate equipment for prison management; weak physical prison infrastructure; non-classification of prisoners; little information on prisoners; lack of contact with the outside world (faith and family) by prisoners; ideological or political protests; gangs; unresolved prisoner grievances; and repressive punishment regimes.

In many post-conflict countries, prison staff members are poorly paid, have had little or no prison training, and have minimal supervision; therefore, they may be susceptible to corruption. If the conditions of prison staff are not addressed, then all other security measures become ineffective.

Prison staff members need to be present, attentive and vigilant. They must conduct a range of regular security functions and demonstrate to prisoners that they know what is going on and can maintain the good order of the prison.

Special measures need to be put in place to separate and protect women, juveniles and other vulnerable prison populations. They can be the target of abuse and may be particularly at risk in prison incidents.

The United Nations Department of Peacekeeping Operations (DPKO) approach to supporting prison systems is underpinned by international norms and standards, including the *Universal Declaration of Human Rights* (1948)¹ and the *Standard Minimum Rules for the Treatment of Prisoners* (1955).² Other international standards, such as the *Convention against Torture and Other Cruel, Inhuman or Degrading Treatment or Punishment*,³ the *United Nations Basic Principles of Use of Force and Firearms by Law Enforcement Officials*,⁴ the Bangkok Rules⁵ for women and the Beijing Rules⁶ for juveniles, are of equal importance.

United Nations Corrections Officers are guided by the DPKO Policy Directive, *Prison Support in UN Peacekeeping Operations*,⁷ as it relates to their roles and functions vis à vis the national prison authorities. The policy clearly outlines expectations and specific areas of focus for those involved in the corrections components of United Nations peace operations.

In the past several years, DPKO has been instrumental in developing a number of guidance materials to assist corrections advisors in their capacity-building efforts in United Nations missions. These are specifically referred to throughout this handbook and in the bibliography.

1 Resolution 217A (III) adopted by the United Nations General Assembly on 10 December 1948, *Universal Declaration of Human Rights*.

2 United Nations, *Standard Minimum Rules for the Treatment of Prisoners*, adopted by the First United Nations Congress on the Prevention of Crime and the Treatment of Offenders, Geneva, 1955.

3 Resolution 39/46 adopted by the United Nations General Assembly on 10 December 1984, *Convention against Torture and Other Cruel, Inhuman or Degrading Treatment or Punishment*.

4 United Nations, *Basic Principles on the Use of Force and Firearms by Law Enforcement Officials*, adopted by the Eighth United Nations Congress on the Prevention of Crime and the Treatment of Prisoners, Havana, Cuba, 27 August to 7 September 1990.

5 Resolution 65/229 adopted by the General Assembly on the report of the Third Committee (A/65/457), 2011, *Rules for the Treatment of Women Prisoners and Non-custodial Measures for Women Offenders* (the Bangkok Rules).

6 United Nations, *Standard Minimum Rules for the Administration of Juvenile Justice*, (the Beijing Rules), resolution 40/34 adopted by the General Assembly on 29 November 1985.

7 United Nations Department of Peacekeeping Operations, Policy Directive, *Prison Support in United Nations Peacekeeping Operations*, December 2005.

Other useful guidance documents relevant to prisons have been developed by the Office of the High Commissioner for Human Rights (OHCHR), the United Nations Office on Drugs and Crime (UNODC) and the United Nations Development Programme (UNDP). For example, Section V, “Making Prisons Safe Places,” in *Human Rights and Prisons: Manual on Human Rights Training for Prison Officials*⁸ provides an important context for developing prison security policies and procedures.

This handbook focuses explicitly on the distinct elements of prison security required to maintain the good order of a prison and the types of control measures required to prevent and manage security incidents. There remains, however, a further need to develop specific guidelines on the security aspects of prison construction and renovation.

8 United Nations Office of the High Commissioner for Human Rights, *Human Rights and Prisons: Manual on Human Rights Training for Prison Officials* (Professional Training Series Number 11), New York and Geneva, 2005.

Key Concepts

Good Order: The application of a set of rules and regulations which govern the daily lives of prisoners through established routines without fear for their personal safety. These routines result in the vast majority of prisoners co-operating.

Control: The use of the prison security infrastructure and equipment and the use of force to manage and respond to prison incidents.

Dynamic Security: The concept of prison staff actively and frequently observing and interacting with prisoners to gain a better understanding and awareness of prisoners and assessing the risks that they represent.

Static Security: The security infrastructure including walls, barriers, lighting, locks and equipment used to restrain prisoners when necessary.

Contingency Planning: Anticipating possible serious incidents within a prison and determining how each may be resolved with the resources available.

Incident Management: The ability to accurately assess the nature and scope of the incident and the risks involved, the ability to quickly contain and control the incident area, continue to operate the rest of the prison, determine the appropriate intervention strategy / options (proportionality), intervene effectively to resolve the incident, and then follow a plan to resume normal prison routines. The focus is on the preservation of life and the safety of staff, prisoners and visitors

Use of Force Continuum: A use of force continuum is a standard that provides guidelines as to the degree of force to be used in a given situation. Each level in the continuum is relative to a corresponding level of a prisoner's resistance. While the specific progression of force varies considerably, normally the use of force progression is as follows:

- *Staff presence* – no force is used and this is the desired way to resolve the situation
- *Verbalization* – force is not physical – direct orders
- *Empty-hand control* – staff use different holds to restrain the prisoner
- *Non-lethal force* – staff use non-lethal technology to gain control
 - a baton or shield to immobilize a prisoner, restraints
- *Lethal force* – staff use lethal weapons (firearms). Lethal force can only be used to avert imminent threat of death or serious injury

A photograph of two men in prison uniforms, consisting of white long-sleeved shirts and trousers with thin vertical stripes. They are standing in front of a metal barred gate. The man on the left is hugging the man on the right from behind. The background is a textured, light-colored wall. The entire image is overlaid with a semi-transparent orange filter.

Chapter 1

Principles of Prison Security: Good Order and Control




Chapter 1. Principles of Prison Security: Good Order and Control

The majority of prison activity from a security perspective needs to focus on maintaining the good order of the prison on a daily basis. At certain times, there may be a need to increase the level of control over prisoners to prevent and / or manage prison incidents.

Each of these two areas of focus (good order and control) includes specific elements that need to be understood from a prison management perspective.

Good order and control in prisons need to be supported, directed and monitored by having management systems, policies and processes in place. An operational framework needs to be in place to ensure a consistent focus and application of key security routines, adequate numbers of trained and competent staff, and standards that hold staff and prison management accountable.

Although each prison service may vary in organization and context, the operational framework (management systems, policies and processes) needs to form part of the



overall assessment of good order and control by corrections advisors, since effective prison management ultimately paves the way for effectively performing prison security operations.

When assessing prison security at different points during the lifetime of a mission, the following determinants (as illustrated above) need to be taken into account regarding each of the key security responsibilities and functions identified above.

- **Political will**

For example:

Does the host government agree with the implementation of key prison security measures?

Are the right people (prisoners) in prisons?

What impact do fines and other sentencing options have on populations?

Does political will include recognition of and respect for international human rights principles?

- **Cultural appropriateness**

For example:

Are there cultural issues that may affect searching, codes of conduct and classification of prisoners?

- **Capacity to implement**

For example:

Is there sufficient staff and are staff members in the right proportions (eg ratio of staff to prisoners and gender). To what extent have they received proper training?

Are there adequate policies, procedures and guidelines in place?

What impact is the limited capacity of the police and courts having on prisons?

- **Respect for human rights**

For example:

Are all key security procedures in accordance with international human rights norms and standards?

There are three basic sources of information in conducting an assessment / reassessment of the nature and reliability of security in a prison.

1. Information gained by direct observation
2. Internal prison service documentation, policies, sanctioned procedures, etc., including incident reports

3. External standards and reference documents, including a number of United Nations and other international standards (human rights, the *Standard Minimum Rules for the Treatment of Prisoners*, the Bangkok Rules for women and the Beijing Rules for juveniles)

The functions of good order and control overlap in some areas and are mutually reinforcing. Prisons should create a culture that favours negotiation and fulfilment of basic human needs over coercive controls.

On a normal day in a prison, the daily routines, interactions and the presence of staff are aimed at maintaining a safe, humane and secure environment – an environment characterized by good order, where a set of rules and regulations governs the daily lives of prisoners, where routines are established and where prisoners do not fear for their personal safety. These rules and routines contribute to an environment in which the vast majority of prisoners are cooperative.

There are, however, times when staff members need to use force to control prisoners and prevent or manage incidents. Control includes static security (security infrastructure and equipment, such as lighting, barriers, restraint equipment, communications, vehicles, locks, keys and towers); incident management (specialized training, incident response teams, etc.); and use of force (authorities, chain of command, policies, procedures and training).

A photograph of two men in striped prison uniforms hugging in front of a barred window. The image is overlaid with a semi-transparent orange filter. The man on the left is taller and has his arms around the shoulders of the shorter man on the right. They are both looking down. The background shows a wall and a window with vertical bars.

Chapter 2

Maintaining Good Order



Chapter 2. Maintaining Good Order

To effectively guide staff in their daily routines, and to maintain good order, a number of organizational elements need to be in place, including relevant policies, security processes and routines, supervision of staff and prisoners, and clear plans on how to proceed should a prison incident occur.

As outlined below, these include:

- an adequate operational framework (legislation and authorities)
- accountability (reporting mechanism to prison service management, checking compliance with prison service policies and directives)
- operational capacity and competence (ratio of staff to prisoners, organizational structure, skill level, code of conduct, prisoner rules of behaviour and discipline processes)
- elements of dynamic security (staff presence, interaction, observation, information gathering, knowledge of each prisoner, conflict management, searching, counting prisoners, patrols, observation and supervision, movement control, visitors)
- contingency planning (desktop planning for both internal and external emergencies, natural disasters, scenarios)

A. Operational frameworks

The political and cultural environment governs the way in which a prison service is managed. The country's constitution and legal framework should provide the overall strategic and operational parameters for the entire prison service.

The prison service must then translate these high-level directives into relevant policies, accountabilities and responsibilities governing the daily operation of each prison. This is articulated in a prison operational framework, which may include such documents as:

- legislation relating to prisons (laws, regulations, etc.)
- policies and procedures (directives, post orders, etc.)
- staff instructions (code of conduct, disciplinary processes, job descriptions, etc.)
- prisoner instructions (rules, disciplinary processes, etc.)

These can be further refined at each prison to provide more detail, according to its security level, size and type of activities. However, a site-specific document cannot contravene any direction established by the prison department.

Corrections advisors should assist prison management in developing prison framework documents, in the following ways:

- referencing the International Centre for Criminal Law Reform and Criminal Justice Policy (ICCLR) generic prison policies⁹ as a guide when developing framework documents
- developing a handbook or poster to provide information on prison policies / procedures, for example, a code of conduct or prisoner complaints process
- having prison management appoint a senior staff member to manage the prisoner complaints process and advise prisoners of changes in operating practices and processes
- asking prisoners, visitors and the local community to comment on prison conditions and practices
- having the prison director meet with prisoners on a regular basis to advise of changes in policies
- arranging for external inspections of the prison, particularly from the judiciary and human rights organizations
- introducing a prisoner records system to file information on each prisoner
- establishing regular meetings between prison management and other justice sector agencies to discuss issues impacting the operations of prisons
- introducing a staff performance assessment process
- gathering and reviewing prisoner information to identify changes, trends and emerging issues
- creating partnerships with international agencies, civil society and donors to support prison reform

B. Accountability

In many post-conflict countries, prison services are generally in the early stages of development, and key accountability and responsibility processes will not have been established. Senior prison managers and prison directors generally do not come from a corrections background and are frequently moved around within the organization, which can be detrimental to accountability.

9 International Centre for Criminal Law Reform and Criminal Justice Policy, *International Prison Policy Development Instrument*, Vancouver, July 2001.

In addition, prison policies and procedures are often non-existent, not known or not applied. There are no or few consequences when prison staff members do not follow procedures. This extends to prison management not being able to ensure regular staff attendance, which can severely jeopardize the good order of a prison.

Prison management should create a set of internal indicators, processes and structures that enable internal and external assessment and monitoring of the performance of the prison as a whole, staff performance and the ability of the prison to maintain good order. These accountability mechanisms must be appropriate for the relevant command structures, resources and capacities within each prison, taking into account the country's political and cultural context. They must also be relevant to the Ministry responsible for prisons and in accordance with international standards and human rights principles related to prisons.


The development of such mechanisms not only allows a prison service to be more transparent, accountable and credible in its internal operations, but also makes it possible to present clear and complete reports to the government and to local and international communities.

Oversight mechanisms, as described below, coupled with internal prison management systems, provide a more comprehensive picture of the issues affecting a prison.

Corrections advisors should assist prison service management in establishing national prison reporting mechanisms, operational frameworks and organizational structures that increase accountability and transparency in the management of prisons.

Assessments from a variety of different sources can address staff performance, static security, dynamic security, incident response, compliance with international standards and human rights principles, prisoner complaints, etc.

A combination of regular internal and external prison inspections, including the systematic review of operating policies and procedures and staff performance, should identify gaps in effectiveness and recommend corrective actions.



In some countries, the prison service is not a separate institution, but rather a section within the police service. This restricts decision-making and the equitable distribution of resources, does not distinguish between the different functions of the two organizations and can compromise the good order of a prison. For example, police are generally less likely to apply elements of dynamic security, relying solely on static security to manage prisoners. Relying primarily on locks and barriers rather than establishing appropriate security routines and procedures can undermine the ability to anticipate incidents.

In many post-conflict countries, prison staff members are generally poorly paid, are transferred from the military, and lack the capacity to effectively manage prisoners and ensure the good order of a prison. In addition, effective staff selection processes can be compromised as a result of nepotism and favouritism. These factors adversely affect prisoner management and the relationship between staff and prisoners that is crucial to the good order of a prison. Inappropriate relationships can range from staff exploiting and abusing prisoners to prisoners manipulating and corrupting or compromising staff.

In establishing a prison environment that respects the rule of law, it is essential to clearly articulate the core values and principles governing staff behaviour and these should form the basis of staff recruitment and selection. In addition, clear procedures should be developed to address non-compliance and poor performance by staff.

Corrections advisors should assist prison service management in developing a staff code of conduct and disciplinary processes to address, among other things, staff absenteeism.

Corrections advisors should also assist prison management in identifying key security posts and operationally adjusting the deployment of staff to ensure these posts are staffed as a priority.

The development of a code of conduct for all staff should include expectations of appropriate behaviour, such as:

- conducting themselves in a manner which reflects positively on the prison service
- carrying out their duties in a diligent and competent manner and complying with legislation, policies, procedures, directives, manuals and other official documents
- following the instructions of supervisors
- interacting with the public in a professional, timely manner and with courtesy
- attendance at work
- dress code
- alcohol and drug use
- relationships with other staff (harassment, discrimination etc.)
- relationships with prisoners (mistreatment, respect, honesty etc.)
- maintaining confidentiality

A clear staff disciplinary process also needs to be developed and clearly documented, with all infractions and associated sanctions listed.

C. Operational capacity and competence

From a human resources point of view, three types of security challenges exist for a prison service. There are inadequate numbers of staff albeit who are well trained (little capacity but competent), an abundance of staff who are not trained (capacity but little competence), or too few staff with little or no training.

Staff capacity

Capacity includes the presence of staff, and the procedures and practices they are required to follow. The ratio of staff to prisoners, the way in which staff members are assigned within the prison, distinct responsibilities, reporting lines, and how staff members are supervised all have an impact on a prisons' capacity to maintain good order and to exercise control in preventing and managing security incidents.

Staff competence

The objective of prison officer training is to provide staff at all levels with the necessary skills and ability to ensure the good order of a prison. Training should be linked to established operational frameworks, including policies, operating procedures, practices, daily routines, contingency plans, incident management procedures, use of force, post orders, job descriptions and code of conduct. International human rights principles and prison management standards should underpin all training.

"The prison administration shall provide for the careful selection of every grade of the personnel, since it is on their integrity, humanity, professional capacity and personal suitability for the work that the proper administration of the institutions depends."

United Nations, Standard Minimum Rules for the Treatment of Prisoners, adopted by the First United Nations Congress on the Prevention of Crime and the Treatment of Offenders, Geneva, 1955, Rule 46 (1).

The aim of training programmes is to have the right people, doing the right things, in the right place at the right time.

Corrections advisors should assist prison management in developing or improving security-related staff training programmes. Where such prison training modules do not exist, appropriate police-based training courses may be of value, through adapting police training modules and / or through having prison staff attend police training courses. Corrections advisors should liaise with United Nations Police (UNPol) to facilitate such training.

Prison security training programmes can also be developed using the DPKO Pre-deployment Training Course, the DPKO *Prison Support Guidance Manual* and the OHCHR four-

part training package for prison officers, *Human Rights and Prisons*.¹⁰ This training may include contingency planning and simulation exercises to give staff practice in predicting and effectively responding to prison incidents.

Indicators can be incorporated into training that will make training evaluations more effective. OHCHR has developed a useful handbook¹¹ in this regard. This handbook also explains other important areas of training, such as “needs assessments.”

A wide range of competency-based training templates and training programme materials are available on the DPKO Rule of Law Community of Practice Network. Training curricula templates are also accessible on the International Corrections and Prisons Association (ICPA) website.

For targeted training methodologies and techniques focusing on human rights, see *Human Rights and Prisons: Trainer’s Guide on Human Rights Training for Prison Officials*,¹² available online.

Corrections advisors should assist prison management in developing a staff training capacity by:

- assessing the training provided to prison staff at all levels
- identifying policies to support training
- prioritizing the development and delivery of training modules
- consulting with the Mission Best Practices and Integrated Mission Training sections
- contacting United Nations Corrections Advisors in other missions for examples of training plans / curriculum etc.
- liaising with UNPOL to assess suitable police training programmes
- promoting training partnerships with police and other organizations
- developing a prison service ‘train-the-trainer’ capacity
- assessing staff training needs (Training Needs Analysis)
- developing training curriculum, modules, plans, etc.
- seeking donors’ support in conducting training programmes

A further issue is that staff training, whether theoretical or practical, is soon forgotten if staff members are not continually applying it. This is particularly true for incident management training, since prison incidents are not frequent occurrences. Staff can

10 Office of the High Commissioner for Human Rights, *Human Rights and Prisons: Trainer’s Guide on Human Rights Training for Prison Officials*, Professional Training Series No.11, United Nations, New York and Geneva, 2005.

11 Office of the High Commissioner for Human Rights, *A Handbook for Human Rights Educator-Evaluating Human Rights Training Activities*, Professional Training Series Number 18, Montreal, 2011.

12 Office of the High Commissioner for Human Rights, *Human Rights and Prisons: Trainer’s Guide on Human Rights Training for Prison Officials*, Professional Training Series No.11, United Nations, New York and Geneva, 2005.

become complacent about the possibility of serious incidents occurring, and as a result may be hesitant or inconsistent in responding effectively when such an incident does occur. Prisoners are generally capable of identifying and taking advantage of these weaknesses.

In many prisons, training is either not anchored in or is inconsistent with policies and procedures, is not of sufficient frequency and lacks practical application. In many of the prisons visited, training staff lacked the skills, techniques and resources to deliver effective training.

The effectiveness of training can be measured in a variety of ways. Evaluation is an important indicator of whether actual performance has improved. Training evaluation can include:

- participant satisfaction and commitment / willingness to apply the training
- knowledge tests involving the capacity to solve problems in operational scenarios
- supervisors' observations of improved performance
- self-assessments that include examples of changed behaviour
- performance in operational simulations

Corrections advisors should assist prison management in developing training evaluation processes to assess the impact of training and its operational application.

D. Elements of dynamic security

Dynamic security refers to actions that contribute to the development of professional, positive relationships between prison staff and prisoners. It is a specific approach to security, based on knowledge of the prisoner population and an understanding of the relationships between prisoners and between prisoners and prison staff. Creating respectful and responsible relationships between prison staff and prisoners is effective in ensuring that the power staff members have over prisoners is not perceived as provocation or punishment and allows staff to better anticipate problems and security risks within a prison.

Dynamic security plays an essential role in the daily management of prisoners. It is described differently in different prison systems around the world, and is often not well understood or practised.

Daily security routines, such as counting prisoners, searching, managing prisoner movement, and classifying and separating prisoners, contribute to good order in a prison and provide staff with essential contact with prisoners. Prison staff members need to understand that interacting with prisoners in a humane and equitable way enhances the security and good order of a prison.

Whereas dynamic security refers to the interaction between prison staff and prisoners, based on positive relationships, information sharing and daily routines, static security refers to the physical infrastructure and equipment within a prison.

Both elements are essential to developing a safe, humane and secure prison environment. Without the benefit of minimal security infrastructure, staff members are restricted in their ability to effectively control and manage prisoners, particularly where overcrowding exists. Similarly, security infrastructure is of limited value if staff capacity and competence are inadequate. This interdependence was often highlighted during serious prison incidents. It is often said that vigilant prison staff members prevent escapes and incidents, not bars and locks.

In many post-conflict environments, prisons generally lack essential static security elements and staff members compensate for this by restricting prisoner movement and by locking prisoners in cells for extended periods. The introduction of effective dynamic security elements, such as increased staff / prisoner contact and interaction, can offset a prison's limited static security components. For example, the introduction of a process to assess the security risk of prisoners may allow for the more effective placement of staff by allocating more staff to supervise high-risk prisoners and fewer staff to supervise lower-risk prisoners.

However, to be effective, dynamic security must be understood and accepted by prison management and must be integrated into all prisoner management activities.

During an incident, prison staff members need to be able to use the static security elements of a prison to their advantage. For example, knowing which barriers need to be secured will help staff move quickly to contain prisoners, and ensure the safety of staff, prisoners and visitors.

Corrections advisors should discuss different security incidents and staff responses with prison management and staff to develop a better understanding. This may result in improving prison policies and operating procedures, changing the way prisoners are managed, and identifying and rectifying static security infrastructure problems.

Corrections advisors should assist prison management in assessing both dynamic and static security elements, prioritize identified improvements and determine how each should be addressed. For many static security improvements, resources will need to be identified.

In many prisons, interaction between staff and prisoners is minimal, especially in prisons where there is severe overcrowding and / or inadequate staffing.

Irrespective of staffing ratios, each contact between staff and prisoners reinforces the relationship between the two, which should be a positive one, based on dignity and mutual respect in how people treat each other, and in compliance with international human rights principles and due process. Prison staff members should also actively supervise prisoners and manage the prison by conducting regular security patrols,

controlling movement, searching, counting prisoners, etc. These activities can provide a better understanding of prisoner behaviours and help assess associated risks.

Security patrols and searches should also continuously assess prison security infrastructure and identify associated risks.

Corrections advisors should reinforce with prison management the importance of establishing both dynamic and static security elements in a prison.

Corrections advisors should recognize that, although a security risk may have been identified and a process or procedure developed to address it, and although relevant staff members have received appropriate training, it should not be assumed that staff members will implement the new process or procedure. In some prisons, it is difficult to change traditional work practices because staff members tend to do things the way they have always done; that is, they tend to work to a “custom and practice” model. Corrections advisors need to challenge old work practices through mentoring until the new practice is implemented.

Corrections advisors should assist prison management in reviewing existing security practices based on their experience and daily observations in the prison. They should promote and support the introduction of improved security practices and identify related staff training requirements.

For consistent system-wide security improvements to occur, corrections advisors should support the development of prison department policies / procedures that can be applied in all prisons.

The key to achieving effective dynamic security rests in initially ensuring acceptance from prison department management and then implementation by operational management at each prison. Dynamic security needs to be supported by the development of appropriate policies and procedures, and effective staff recruitment, selection and training by prison department management. Prison staff should be made aware of the advantages of implementing dynamic security in a prison and how it enhances security beyond the strict application of prison rules and regulations.

Dynamic security is more effectively implemented in a prison when prison management actively supports its introduction and leads by example, for instance, by routinely visiting all areas of the prison and talking to both staff and prisoners.

Prisoner classification

The development of a process to effectively classify each prisoner is based on available information regarding the prisoner, including such aspects as:

- offence history
- current offence

- length of sentence
- age
- gender
- vulnerability
- medical status
- escape / incident history
- current behaviour and previous prison disciplinary history
- ethnicity / faith
- associations
- military or former combatant history
- family / community support

This information can guide prison management in determining the most appropriate way of managing a prisoner, including placement within the prison and the degree of supervision required. Prisoners should be classified on admission and reassessed after any significant event that may affect the prisoner's management (for example, following sentencing).

An effective classification process focuses on the needs of individual prisoners, as opposed to the traditional approach of treating all prisoners the same. Attempting to manage all prisoners on the assumption that they all present the same level of risk is unjust and is an inefficient use of resources.

Corrections advisors should assist prison management in developing appropriate prison classification processes and train prison staff in their application as they relate to the management of each prisoner.

The ability of prison management to manage prisoners as individuals or individual groups, rather than as one homogeneous group, through an effective classification and separation process, contributes significantly to the good order of a prison and facilitates the rehabilitation of prisoners. However, the ability to physically separate different categories of prisoner (for example violent from non-violent offenders) depends on the infrastructure of the prison and the degree of overcrowding. In many prisons in mission areas, effective physical separation is not possible.

Prisoner supervision and movement control

In many countries, prison security focuses solely on static infrastructure, such as walls, barriers and concertina wire. Dynamic approaches are not recognized or considered relevant in maintaining security and good order.

Corrections advisors should assist prison management in better understanding the role and benefits in creating a prison operating framework that combines both static and dynamic elements, including developing and training prison staff in the regular counting of prisoners and introducing count boards in key areas of the prison to record prisoner numbers.

Counting large numbers of prisoners in crowded accommodation areas can be more easily conducted by having staff form the prisoners into rows and then move past the prison staff in single file. Staff should also be positioned to observe other prisoners during this process so that individual prisoners cannot avoid being counted or attempt to be “double-counted.”

Corrections advisors should assist prison management in developing meaningful, structured daily routines for prisoners, which contribute to prisoner rehabilitation and the good order of the prison. Having an empty exercise yard while prisoners remain contained in often overcrowded cells is of no benefit. Structuring regular exercise periods or allowing smaller groups of prisoners to exercise should be encouraged.

Daily routines that incorporate close contact between prison staff and prisoners promote interaction and improve observation and supervision. In prisons where there is insufficient staff or where interaction with prisoners is passive or infrequent, relationships built on respect and fairness are virtually impossible to achieve. Without an active staff presence, prisoners are left to manage themselves, and prisoners can be intimidated, manipulated and threatened.

Female prison staff should supervise women prisoners. If male prison staff members are required to enter the women prisoners’ area, they should be accompanied by a female staff member and remain in her sight at all times. Women prisoners should be advised when a male staff member is about to enter their area.

Corrections advisors should assist prison management in determining effective staff levels commensurate with the number and types of prisoners detained, and determine how inadequate staffing levels can be addressed.

Corrections advisors should assist prison management in establishing staff posts within the prison, to enable effective interaction between staff and prisoners and to improve prisoner supervision.

In many post-conflict locations, not all elements of effective prison security may be fully realized during the life of the mission. That said, these elements need to form the basis for improving prison security and the management of prisoners.

The following are examples of elements that deal with the supervision and movement control of prisoners. The list should not be considered as exhaustive and is not in order of priority. All components contribute to the good order and security of a prison.

Effectively managing the movement of prisoners within a prison depends on:

- staffing levels being commensurate with the number of prisoners
- the level of staff skills and competency
- the layout / configuration of the prison
- the effectiveness of static security infrastructure
- the ability to effectively classify and separate categories of prisoners

Specific procedures should be developed to manage different types of prisoners when they are moving between secure and less-secure areas of a prison or to insecure external locations:

- high risk prisoners
- groups of prisoners
- vulnerable prisoners
- mentally or physically ill prisoners

A security procedure should therefore cover:

- permitted movement times
- reasons for movement
- approved methods of movement
- designated “out-of-bounds” areas

Prison management often has to make difficult decisions where limited resources exist. In some prisons, movement out of and access to cells is controlled by the application of restraints, such as leg restraints, particularly for high-risk prisoners and where the prison’s physical infrastructure is considered inadequate in providing effective security. An alternative could be the use of plastic handcuffs or plastic straps. They are cheaper and easier to carry than metal handcuffs (although they cannot be reused).

Although extended use of restraints during exercise periods is not a recommended practice, it allows a degree of movement and more importantly access to fresh air for prisoners. The risk of not using restraints needs to be weighed against the risk of potential escape of other prisoner related incident.

In some prisons, prisoners were used to control movement in certain areas and were provided with keys. Corrections advisors should discourage such practices and assist prison management in developing improved security procedures for staff.

In many prisons, staff members who are escorting a prisoner outside the prison are not provided with documentation or a photograph identifying the prisoner, although

these may need to be provided to police should the prisoner escape. In addition, many prisons do not have specific prisoner transport vehicles and rely on a variety of means of transport to move prisoners, including walking, motorcycles, etc. Another important consideration in escorting prisoners is the “sight and / or sound” requirement, which requires staff to remain in close enough proximity to see and / or hear the prisoner at all times.

Prior to conducting an external escort of a dangerous or high-security risk prisoner, a Threat Risk Assessment (TRA) should be completed by a senior prison officer. The TRA should consider:

- the consequences of the threat being realized (personal injury / seriousness and degree of harm, etc.)
- the likelihood of risks based on past experience, the prisoner’s profile, etc.
- the escort location (crowded public place / remote location, etc.)

Basic external escort procedures should not change irrespective of the circumstances or the security risk posed by the prisoner. Every TRA should determine how the escort is to be conducted, including:

- number of staff involved
- escort purpose and destination
- staff actions at the escort destination (hospital, court, etc.)
- search requirements
- use of restraints and frequency of checks
- communication and reporting frequency
- escort times
- type of transport and travel routes
- documentation to be carried, including photographs
- staff and prisoner clothing
- criteria for terminating the escort
- confidentiality of escort details

Corrections advisors should assist prison management in developing a Threat Risk Assessment approach in planning all high-risk security escorts. This should form part of an on-going review of prisoner escort practices, particularly in relation to high-risk prisoners.

Staff escorting the prisoner should also anticipate situations in which additional assistance may be required if the security circumstances of the escort change, for example when a prisoner must move through a crowded area or an escort vehicle breaks down. They should be able to respond and act quickly and concisely.

Corrections advisors should assist prison management in developing external escort procedures covering staff to prisoner ratio, use and type of restraints, identification of prisoners and acceptable transport methods and train prison staff in these procedures.

In addition to the TRA requirements above, the following should apply to medical escorts:

- escort staff should ensure the examination room and surrounding area are secure before the prisoner enters
- when a prisoner is admitted to hospital, escort staff should provide the following information to nursing staff:
 - the name of the prisoner
 - the number of escort staff
 - any restraint equipment used

If the prisoner is taken to an operating room, escort staff should:

- remove restraints if required by medical staff
- accompany the prisoner to the operating room
- check the operating room for possible escape opportunities (doors, windows)
- wait in a location as close as possible to the operating room until the operation is completed
- with the approval of medical staff, reapply restraints

Pregnant women prisoners should not be restrained during labour and delivery, and restraints should only be applied if approved by medical staff.

If medical staff requests the removal of a restraint and if, in the opinion of the escort staff, this would pose a risk to the safety of others, escort staff should advise medical staff of the risk and contact the prison director for guidance before removing the restraint.

Searching

Searches within prisons include areas within the prison, prisoners, prisoner property, visitors, vehicles and staff. Search processes should be consistent with the *Standard Minimum Rules for the Treatment of Prisoners*, human rights principles and prison legislation, and proper consideration should be given to gender and to religious and cultural practices. Prison staff members are provided with the authority for regular searches by way of policy.

In many of the prisons visited, there was an apprehension about searching as a regular practice. Prison staff members often consider searching people to be disrespectful, intrusive and inappropriate.

Where prison staff members believe, on reasonable grounds, that a delay in obtaining authorization to conduct a search would result in a risk to life or safety or in the loss / destruction of prohibited or unauthorized items, the staff member may proceed with the search without authorization.

Corrections advisors should advocate with prison management and staff on the security benefits of conducting regular searches, assist in developing clear procedures covering all types of searches and train prison staff in search techniques.

Corrections advisors should assist prison management in developing prison search plans covering all areas of the prison, and specifying the frequency and irregularity of area searches so prisoners cannot predict them.

Corrections advisors should assist prison management in developing prison procedures dealing with the recording, handling and disposal of prohibited and unauthorized items (contraband).

Area searches

Routine area searches are non-intrusive and are used to detect contraband or unauthorized items that may be concealed within the prison, in vehicles entering the prison, in prisoner property, etc., and that could jeopardize the good order of the prison.

An area search plan should include the following information:

- area to be searched
- type of search and equipment required
- search date and time
- frequency and irregularity of searches
- justification – reasonable grounds (suspicion)
- specific items to search for
- prison staff to conduct the search
- report requirements

Considerations for sustaining effective search plans:

- establishing a systematic search routine for every search – the more methodical the search, the less likely that something will be overlooked
- the pace and thoroughness of the search – prisoners have no time to find creative ways of concealing items
- search equipment (gloves, mirror wands, flashlights, etc.) and ensuring its use to prevent injuries to staff
- searching carefully in areas that cannot be seen clearly
- ensuring prisoners do not observe the search

External organizations (police, military, UNPol, etc.), if authorized, may be used to supplement a prison's capacity to conduct searches and may be able to provide search equipment not available to the prison. External personnel should be briefed prior to the search, agree to follow the search policy of the prison and be supervised during the search.

Personal searches

Searches of people (prisoners, visitors and staff) are generally intrusive, unless detection equipment (hand-held or walk-through scanners) is used. Therefore, prison staff must conduct such searches with due respect for gender and religious and cultural considerations.

Personal searches include:

- frisk search
Prison staff members use their hands to "pat down" the person's body through their outer clothing.
- strip search
The person must remove their clothing and undergo a detailed visual inspection of their body. This must be done in private, and out of sight of others, by at least two prison staff of the same sex as the person. There is no physical contact.
- cavity search
This involves an internal cavity examination. It is extremely intrusive and, if required, should only be conducted by trained medical personnel.

Prior to a personal search, prison staff should advise the person of:

- the reason for the search
- the type of search to be conducted based on perceived security risk
- the directions the person is to follow
- the possible actions if a prohibited or unauthorized item is found

Prior to any search of a visitor, the visitor must consent to the search. If the visitor does not consent, prison staff may refuse entry or restrict the visitor to a non-contact visit.

All personal searches should be conducted in a discrete and preferably private area. This is particularly relevant when searching women and children.

A prison officer may conduct a routine non-intrusive or frisk search of another staff member, without having to state the grounds for individual suspicion, when that other staff member is entering or leaving the institution.

When prison management believes on reasonable grounds that a staff member is carrying a prohibited or unauthorized item, the prison director may authorize that the staff

member be searched. If the staff member does not consent to the search, the person should be directed to remain under observation at the location and the prison director advised. The prison director should then determine the action to be taken, including possible referral to police.

Corrections advisors should determine with prison management the types of personal searches to be conducted, based on gender, religious and cultural considerations, and then assist prison management in developing procedures that include the issues discussed above.

Staff patrols

Prison staff should conduct regular patrols of all areas within a prison, and of both the inside and the outside of the security perimeter (wall, fence, etc. of the prison). This is to:

- deter potential incidents by providing a frequent staff presence
- identify unauthorized movement or activity
- detect / prevent security breaches of, threats to or tampering with security infrastructure
- verify the integrity of static security elements (locks, barriers, fences, walls, concertina wire, lighting, fire equipment, etc.)
- detect prohibited or unauthorized items, including items that may assist an escape (ladder, rope, wire, etc.) or be used as weapons
- identify unsafe work conditions

Corrections advisors should participate in security patrols and searches, identify gaps in effectiveness and recommend actions, including development of procedures, training etc., to address these. Procedures should include frequency of patrols, patrol staff reporting observations and the actions taken by prison management to address identified problems.

When prison staff members report an observation to prison management, management should confirm the information and assess the security risk, based on:

- the degree of detail provided
- the nature of the observed risk
- the probability of consequences and security implications
- the frequency of similar observations
- the capacity of the prison to respond

Corrections advisors should assist prison management in assessing security risks and developing appropriate actions, including identifying resources and funding sources, and ensure that identified security threats are dealt with confidentially.

E. Contingency planning

This section describes the key elements that need to be developed for a prison to be able to effectively anticipate, manage and resolve serious prison incidents, including natural or external emergencies.

Contingency planning involves anticipating a variety of serious incidents that could occur and determining how each may be resolved with the resources available. Sharing incident reports among prisons will assist in developing possible scenarios and raise staff awareness of predictable or unforeseen incidents that could occur.

A contingency plan should be established for each incident scenario. The plan should be one that can be quickly activated, without any confusion on how to proceed.

Contingency planning must include a clear understanding of the use of force in responding to each scenario. Contingency plans need to clearly detail and describe the nature and extent of authorized use of force to address the incident.

Key aspects of contingency planning include:

- roles, responsibilities and chain of command for key prison staff and external support personnel (police, fire services, medical services, etc.) are explicit, and mutually agreed-upon and understood
- joint training and simulation exercises are conducted with police and other external support
- detailed processes are outlined to effectively respond to a particular incident
- communications linkages between the prison and external support are provided for, before, during and after the incident

At many prisons, the capacity to respond to serious incidents is limited and relies heavily on external security forces. Therefore, it is critical to establish relevant partnerships to help maintain the safety of the prison. The proximity of external security forces to the prison and response times are extremely important because, in many prisons, staffing levels and available security equipment do not allow incidents to be isolated or contained for lengthy periods.

Corrections advisors should support prison management in developing the prison's capacity to respond effectively to incidents.

In some countries, prisons have established dedicated and trained rapid-response groups, and corrections advisors have supported staff training in incident management using specialized equipment from donors.

In some countries, national police have established special teams to deal with civil unrest, and these may also be used to assist prison staff in managing prison incidents. It should

be noted, however, that the national police are unlikely to have extensive knowledge of a particular prison environment. In some countries, national police visit prisons as part of their daily patrols and are familiar with the prison's operations and layout; they are therefore better prepared to intervene if and when required. Corrections advisors should encourage this as a daily form of interaction.

Mitigation

Mitigation involves the identification of risks, generally through a physical risk assessment that identifies and evaluates hazards, their perceived risk, the probability of their occurrence and the range of effects they are likely to have.

Security inspections identify such risks. In many prisons in post-conflict countries, there is a desire to improve prison security, but often a lack of political attention or the allocation of necessary resources to address these risks. In such situations, corrections advisors should support prison management in documenting and discussing identified risks with prison headquarters management.

Preparedness

Preparedness involves setting out how behaviour can be changed to limit the impact of a prison incident. In the preparedness phase, contingency plans are developed to manage and counter risks, and action is taken to build the capabilities needed to implement the plans.

Common preparedness measures include:

- communication plans
- emergency population warning methods
- essential stockpiling of items, including food, medical supplies, etc.
- identification of external support with experience in dealing with serious incidents
- casualty prediction

Contingency planning model¹³



¹³ Dr Richard Haigh, "Disaster Management Lifecycle", licensed under the Creative Commons Attribution, Centre for Disaster Resilience, University of Salford, Adapted from and accessed August 2012.

Response

The response phase includes the mobilization of necessary emergency services and first responders at the incident site / area. These may include core emergency services, such as fire services, police and medical personnel.

A well-rehearsed contingency plan enables efficient response coordination.

Corrections advisors should support prison management in developing and rehearsing contingency plans. A first step should be to discuss previous incidents and how they were resolved with prison management. Then determine the response capacity of the prison in addressing perceived internal and external (natural disasters, etc.) incidents.

Part of a prison's response to certain incidents should include a community warning mechanism to advise people living in close proximity to the prison of the potential danger.

A prison's ability to respond to an incident is based on:

- existing structures, operating parameters and processes
- the ability to be creative, improvisational and adaptable¹⁴

Recovery

The aim of the recovery phase is to restore the affected area to its previous state. It differs from the response phase in that its focus is on issues and decisions that must be made after immediate needs are addressed. Recovery efforts primarily concern actions that involve the repair of essential infrastructure, treating those who have been injured and working with the police to apprehend escapees.

In many prisons, there is little, if any, special equipment to address an incident. In several countries, however, donors have provided riot equipment, security locks, etc.

Corrections advisors should, in consultation with their national counterparts:

- identify possible sources for the provision of security equipment, including obtaining surplus or decommissioned equipment from other prison services
- consider the sustainability of any donated equipment, including the ability to maintain any highly technical equipment
- consider joint training programmes with police in the use of incident management equipment

¹⁴ John R. Harrald, "Agility and Discipline: Critical Success Factors for Disaster Response," *The Annals of the American Academy of Political and Social Science* 604 (March 2006), p. 256.

Scenarios, Simulations and Table-top Exercises

Scenarios

A scenario is an outline or model of an expected or supposed sequence of events. The use of table-top exercises and simulations (where resources permit) for each scenario allows a prison to develop and practise its response capacity. They also encourage and focus staff competencies related to incident management, and ensure that authorities, capacities and expectations are clear and appropriate. Every element of a contingency plan should be examined, and supporting checklists, drills and scenarios should be developed and integrated into prison routines.

Corrections advisors should support prison management in conducting scenario exercises, resulting in the development of basic checklists and contingency plans for the prison. Once developed, these should be practised using table-top exercises or simulations, using information from past incidents and within the framework of existing operational policies, organizational structures and staff capacity.

Key considerations in assessing different scenarios and related responses include:

- what resources are needed immediately at the scene?
- how will prison management obtain these resources?
- what reactions or problems are likely in making contact with the prisoners?
- what resources might be needed if the incident extends over several hours or days?
- who should be involved in each scenario?
- who should be notified (local, state, national or private agencies)?

In addressing these considerations, each action needs to be specified and prioritized. This does not have to be a lengthy or elaborate process, but each consideration should be addressed, even in its simplest, most practical and pragmatic form.

Contingency plans should be operational, functional and reviewed regularly. Contingency planning has traditionally focused on internal prison incidents (prisoner disturbances, escapes, fires, hostage situations, etc.). Plans should also address external threats, including natural disasters, terrorist threats and organized gang activities. In countries where gangs are prevalent, or in prisons detaining both military and civilian prisoners, organized gangs and / or militia groups should be considered in a prison's incident preparedness.

It is also important for prison management to regularly meet with police to discuss community security issues that may affect the operation and security of a prison. The gathering of information, based on dynamic security within the prison (as described in section D above), can supplement and confirm information from police and other sources.

The collection of information from various sources allows prison management to make informed decisions related to the security of the prison (for example, by transferring high-risk prisoners to other prisons if escape plans are discovered). This was done successfully in one prison, where some military personnel planned to attack the prison to free military prisoners. The prisoners were quickly transferred and the escape attempt thwarted.

In another prison, a prisoner informant provided information concerning the smuggling of explosives into the prison. A search was conducted and the explosives discovered and removed.

Simulations

There are several aspects to consider in developing simulations, including:

- learning objectives
- key events in the simulation
- format
- design
- training
- equipment
- safety procedures
- debriefing
- evaluation – lessons learned, adjustments required, new or additional training needs identified

The simulation should be developed to encourage those involved to view it as a learning experience and a way of improving their skills and teamwork.

The simulation should also assess the degree to which prison policies, procedures and staff capacity are compatible, and highlight gaps that need to be addressed through further training.

Corrections advisors should support prison management in developing simulation exercises, with a plan that should include:

- an overview of each scenario
- a clear list of objectives
- copies of policies / procedures applicable to the incident
- equipment required
- instructions for incident responders and role players

Conducting live simulations within an operating prison may be complicated due to the close proximity of prisoners and the need to take prison staff away from their regular duties to conduct the simulation. However, there are sometimes opportunities for simulation exercises – even complex, large-scale exercises – where a new prison is yet to open or in an old prison that is no longer used.

Corrections advisors should support prison management in developing an annual systematic review of the prison's contingency plans, including updating contact lists (resources and government agencies) and conducting table-top or simulation exercises at an appropriate site. This may cover a range of possible incidents, including a prisoner disturbance, hostage situation, mass escape, etc., to reinforce the capacity of prison staff. Corrections advisors should seek donor support to sponsor such an exercise where additional resources are required.

Corrections advisors should support prison management in ensuring that contingency planning and incident management training is integrated into the broader staff training programme.

It is essential that all those involved in a simulation, or observing a simulation, are advised that it is a training scenario and not a real incident.

Table-top Exercises

A table-top exercise is a facilitated analysis of an emergency situation in an informal, stress-free environment. It involves prison staff and external support (police, fire services, medical services, etc.). This type of exercise examines whether the roles, responsibilities and capacities of each participant are sufficient to address the scenario being tested.

Table-top exercises are less complex than simulations and are the simplest type of exercise to conduct in terms of planning, preparation, and coordination. The success of a table-top exercise is largely determined by the amount of group participation and interaction in identifying problem areas. Participants can generate constructive discussion as they examine problems in existing operational plans, identify where they need to be refined or recommend new policies be developed. There is only a minimal attempt at simulation in a table-top exercise.

A corrections advisor with experience in conducting incident management exercises should facilitate the table-top exercise. Participants may include prison management, prison headquarters management, fire services, police, medical services, government officials, etc., and each should generate a list of questions regarding the incident as it pertains to their involvement.

Example: Table-top exercise (external threat hostage situation)

At 9 a.m., six gunmen heavily armed with explosives and automatic weapons enter the prison and take control the prison front gate and administration building, including the director's office and visiting area. The gunmen seriously injure two prison staff members at the main gate and take the prison director, six staff and an unknown number of visitors hostage. The gunmen barricade themselves inside building and "booby trap" the front gate and administration building.

The prison is sealed off by local police who call for the gunmen to surrender. At 10 a.m., the gunmen announce they are members of a local gang. They demand that, unless they and 10 'unjustly' jailed members of their group are given safe conduct and allowed to leave the prison, several explosive devices, located at public and private buildings in the town, will be detonated every 60 minutes.

In addition, if demands are not met, the gunmen will execute a staff member or visitor every 60 minutes and post pictures on the internet via cell phone. Once freed, the gunmen state, they will reveal the location of the remaining explosive devices and release the hostages.

They have given one hour until the first device will be detonated and the first hostage executed. The gunmen state that the first explosive device is located at the local hospital. The gunmen contact the local media by cell phone and relay their demands, giving the 10 prisoners' names.

As the media reports the situation at the prison, hundreds of people, including members of the prisoners' families, other groups, media and curious onlookers, congregate at the prison and interfere with the local police operations around the prison.

At 10:30 a.m., an order is given to evacuate the hospital and police resources are dispatched to the hospital to assist with the evacuation.

At 11 a.m., the local media receives a photo of a hostage being executed. At the same time, an explosion takes place at a school located across town from the hospital. The explosion results in 10 casualties (students and teachers), destroying part of the school and starting a fire, which threatens the entire building.

Some questions for participants may include:

- what priorities direct the actions of each organization?
- what are the resources available to each organization?
- who should be in charge of the incident/s?
- what options do each organization have in addressing the situation?
- what areas require special attention and why?
- what other information should be obtained?
- who else should be advised?

Example: Table-top exercise – Evaluation Form

(This template should be modified to address local requirements)

Table-top Exercise – Participant Feedback

Exercise name: Date:

Location of exercise:

Participant’s name: Title:

Organization:

Participant’s role: Player [] Observer [] Facilitator []

Part I – Recommendations and Action Steps

1. Based on discussions and the issues identified, list the top three issues and / or areas needing improvement.

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2. Identify the corrective steps needed to address the issues identified above. For each step, indicate if it is a high, medium or low priority.

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3. Describe the corrective steps that should be taken in your organization and who is responsibility for each.

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Part II – Exercise Design and Conduct

What is your assessment of the design of the exercise and way it was conducted?

(Please rate, from 1 to 5, your assessment of the exercise relative to the statements below, with 1 indicating strong disagreement and 5 indicating strong agreement)

Assessment Factors	Rating of Satisfaction				
	Strongly agree (1) to Strongly disagree (5)				
The exercise was well structured and organized.	1	2	3	4	5
The scenario was plausible and realistic.	1	2	3	4	5
The facilitator was knowledgeable, kept the exercise on target and was sensitive to group dynamics.	1	2	3	4	5
Participation in the exercise was appropriate for someone in my position.	1	2	3	4	5
The participants included the right people in terms of level and mix of disciplines.	1	2	3	4	5
The exercise provided a good test of knowledge / skills of the participants.	1	2	3	4	5
The exercise will enhance my performance during such an incident.	1	2	3	4	5

What changes would you make to improve this exercise?

Example: Basic contingency plan (hostage scenario)

(This template should be modified to address local requirements)

Contingency plans may be simple instructions or complex documents, depending on the characteristics of the prison and available resources; however, there are basic requirements applicable to all prison incident management plans.

First on the scene

The staff member discovering the incident should NOT intervene or communicate with the hostage taker/s, but report the incident immediately to prison management. Alarms should not be activated.

The prison director is responsible for the overall management of the incident, including approving access to the prison for external support organizations (police, etc.).

The prison director should undertake the following activities (some may be done concurrently):

1. Gather information

Designate a senior officer to collect available information, without initiating discussions with the hostage taker/s, including:

- name of hostage/s
- physical state of hostage/s
- name/s of hostage taker/s, if known
- exact location
- weapons used or in sight (type of weapon, if known)
- details of any barricades or restrictions to accessing the hostage area; is there visual contact with the hostage/s and / or hostage taker/s (is / are the hostage/s part of the barricade?)
- hostage taker/s known demands
- other relevant information

2. Isolate and contain the incident scene

Where possible, designate prison staff to secure prisoners not involved in the incident and restrict the movement of prisoners and staff into the incident area. Remove non-essential staff, prisoners and visitors from the prison.

3. Report the incident and seek additional support

Notify prison headquarters management and police, etc., and designate a senior officer to coordinate and liaise with police or other external support.

4. Negotiate with the hostage taker/s

Designate a senior officer to negotiate with the hostage taker/s at the scene and provide that person with any information collected. The negotiator should initiate discussions with the hostage taker/s from a safe distance and:

- note any demands or conditions made and report these to the prison director
- not make promises or concessions, or commit to any actions
- not carry keys, weapons or restraint equipment when negotiating
- regularly advise the prison director on the progress of negotiations

5. Record the incident activities

Designate a senior officer to record all information pertaining to the incident and its management, by developing a time-specific incident log. Information should only be provided to the prison director or others authorized by the director.

Other staff within the prison

- ensure the security of prisoners not involved in the incident
- restrict entry to the prison and access to the incident scene to only essential personnel
- as far as practicable, maintain normal routines within those areas of the prison not affected by the incident and modify routines where required
- do not obstruct access to the incident scene or interfere in the interaction between the negotiator and the hostage taker/s
- prison health staff should:
 - establish a medical aid point close to the incident scene
 - liaise with external support organizations (police, medical services, etc.) regarding provision of medical assistance
- staff members should not leave their posts unless authorized by the prison director

Example: Prison Incident Preparedness Checklist

(This template should be modified to address local requirements)

Prison:

Date of review:

Reviewer/s:

I. General Considerations

Issue	Comment
Is there a policy covering major incidents, including preparation and response?	
Who is in command of the prison?	
Who is in command of the incident?	
What is the chain of command in an incident?	
Are there any limits on the authority of the person/s in command?	
Who has authority to deviate from the contingency plan?	
Who is to be notified and when?	
Does the policy covering major incidents differentiate between planned and reactive use of force?	
Who can approve the use of force and who can use it?	
Who is to liaise with the media?	
Who has authority to release information?	
Are staff members trained or prepared to manage an incident?	
What plans exist for evacuation / transfer (internal and external)?	
Do plans specify that staff members taken hostage have no rank / authority and other staff will not comply with orders from such persons?	
Who has responsibility for incident preparedness?	
How often does the prison conduct contingency exercises and how many have occurred in the past 12 months?	
Are contingency exercises conducted for all shifts?	
Are those responsible for managing an incident trained?	
What items / issues are non-negotiable in managing an incident?	
Is prevention of major incidents discussed at management meetings?	
Is early incident management intervention stressed by management?	
Is there frequent, open communication between staff and prisoners?	

What training do staff members receive in identifying potential security risks (stockpiling of items, increase in the number of groups forming, etc.)?	
How often is the prison inspected for fire risk?	
How effective is the prisoner classification system in managing prisoners?	
How many random cell searches were conducted in the past 12 months?	
How many prison security inspections were conducted in the past 12 months?	
What security equipment exists and how often is it maintained?	
What is the required frequency for inspecting perimeter security, vehicles, gates, visiting areas, etc.?	
How many prisoner grievances were recorded in the past 12 months and what were the main issues of concern? Have these been addressed by prison management?	
Are there official comprehensive contingency plans and are they known by staff?	
What procedures exist for specific incidents and for the aftermath of an incident?	
What specify interagency responsibilities are included in the plans?	
What is the staff recall procedure specified in the plans?	
What prison layouts and / or blueprints are available at the prison? Where are these?	
What actions in the plans relate to injured staff, staff held hostage and families of staff during and after an incident?	
What provisions are in the plans for providing medical / food services, etc. in an incident?	
Where is the primary location for an incident command post?	
What are the procedures for emergency prisoner lockdowns and counts?	
How long will it take for an emergency response team or other tactical team to be mobilized? Which external organizations can provide this function?	
Who can provide hostage negotiators?	
When was the last staff training conducted on incident plans and procedures?	
When was the last staff training on emergency drills and exercises?	
What weapons are approved and who can use them?	
What equipment does the prison have to control a serious incident?	
Where are emergency keys stored and who has access?	
When was the last inventory of security, restraint and incident equipment conducted?	

Example: Prison Security Checklist

(This template should be modified to address local requirements)

Date:		Prison:		
Population		Men:	Women:	Juveniles:
Location		Issue		Comment
v	Prison access	Is there a security post at the entrance to the prison?		
		Is the post easily visible from the street?		
		Are there separate entrances for visitors and staff and for vehicles?		
		Are the entrance gates closed and locked when not in use?		
		Are visitors recorded, including time of entry and exit?		
		Are vehicles that enter recorded?		
	Perimeter and security corridor	Is there a continuous secure perimeter?		
		Can this perimeter prevent escapes?		
		Is the perimeter in good condition?		
		Is there concertina wire and is it properly attached and in place?		
		Is there an interior security corridor? Is prisoner access restricted?		
		Is the prison perimeter illuminated at night?		
		Is the perimeter and security corridor inspected daily by staff?		
		Are these inspections recorded?		
	Towers	Are there security towers and are they used and in good condition?		
		Are there unrestricted views of the interior and exterior perimeter security corridors?		
		Are there unrestricted views of the prison compound, particularly prisoner recreation areas?		
		Are the security towers staffed day and night?		
	Admission	Are there separate admission cells / a separate admissions area?		
		How are prisoners' personal effects secured / stored and recorded?		
		Are all prisoners photographed?		
		Is legal and personal information recorded?		
		Is the prisoner advised of the security rules of the prison?		

	Location	Issue	Comment
	Security	Is the movement of a prisoner into or out of the prison recorded?	
		Are men, women and juveniles physically separated (accommodation, toilets, showers, exercise, etc.)?	
		Is there a head of security?	
		Is there adequate light / lighting in the cells and exercise yards?	
		Are prisoner accommodation areas secure and operational (doors, walls, windows, roofs, etc.)?	
		Are accommodation areas inspected / searched daily?	
		Are exercise areas secure and inspected before prisoner use?	
	Health Clinic	Is the clinic within a secure perimeter?	
		Is the clinic adequate to accommodate the needs of prisoners?	
		Are there secure cells / areas within the clinic?	
		How is prisoner access to the clinic controlled?	
	Visitors	Is visitor access controlled and recorded on entry and exit?	
		What types of visits are allowed and who can authorize a visit?	
		How are visits conducted and supervised?	
	Searches	Are personal searches conducted by staff of the same sex as the person searched?	
		Does the prison have search plans? Are they sufficiently comprehensive?	
		Are searches and the results recorded?	
		Are items permitted in secure areas inspected on entry?	
		Are prohibited and unauthorized items recorded? Where are these stored and how are they disposed of?	
	Counts	At what times are prisoners counted during the day and night?	
		Are the counts consistent, complete and accurate?	
		What actions occur if a count does not concur with the prisoner total?	
		How are prisoner counts recorded?	
	Evacuation	Is there an evacuation plan for the prison?	
		Does it ensure the continued security of prisoners?	
	Prisoner complaints	Is there a procedure to deal with prisoner complaints?	
		Are these recorded?	

A photograph of two men in striped prison uniforms standing in front of a barred window. The man on the left is taller and has his arm around the shoulder of the shorter man on the right. The entire image is covered with a large, semi-transparent orange overlay. The text 'Chapter 3' and 'Maintaining Control' is positioned on the left side of the image.

Chapter 3

Maintaining Control



Chapter 3. Maintaining Control

This chapter will outline the steps required to manage a serious prison incident. Key considerations and elements are identified so that prisons can effectively assess and improve their capacity to manage incidents in a planned, focused and coordinated manner.

Three essential elements need to be in place to control prisoners during a security incident: static security (including infrastructure and equipment such as lighting, barriers, restraint equipment, communications, vehicles, locks, keys and towers); an incident management process; and clear policies and appropriate training on the use of force.

A. Static security

Static security includes the infrastructure and equipment used to manage and contain prisoners. Physical infrastructure includes walls, fences, security towers, lighting, cells, barriers and control posts, etc. Security equipment includes communications, restraints, riot equipment, fire equipment, etc. Static security needs to be supported by policies and operational procedures developed by prison management.

Security inspections that check the infrastructure are regarded as a routine static security measure. The information obtained through inspections should trigger a number of dynamic security measures, including such things as repairs, removal of obstructions, changes to routines and further investigation.

The following are components of prison infrastructure for a high-security prison. They may be adjusted to suit the security requirements of specific prisons.

Perimeter security

A secure perimeter reassures the public that prisoners remain in custody and cannot harm the community. It also indicates to prisoners that any attempt to escape will most likely be unsuccessful.

Ideally, the perimeter should consist of a wall (or secure double chain-link fence/s) with towers, “sally port(s)” (secure, controlled entryway(s) for staff, visitors and vehicles)

and the installation of concertina wire. The perimeter should be installed with lighting adequate to identify persons or other activity in close proximity to the perimeter.

In many post-conflict countries, perimeters vary from prison to prison. Inadequate principle entrances, insecure towers and insufficient locks generally characterize prison perimeters. Most aspects of the perimeter are generally in poor condition.

The proximity of vehicles and other equipment, or structures adjacent to or directly outside or inside the perimeter, represents a risk of prisoner escape. Concertina wire should be installed according to the manufacturer's specifications and remain unrestricted (not covered with debris or prisoner clothing that can obstruct observation or proper functioning).

In the early stages of post-conflict engagement, national military, United Nations security forces or police may be an option to supplement perimeter security. Assistance from UN Police Formed Police Units (FPUs) must be authorized by the mission leadership, within the scope and authority of United Nations operations. Such intervention would be temporary and should be at the request of the national authorities.

Use of National Police

Placing the monitoring of the prison perimeter with police blurs the functional responsibilities of the two organizations. Prison management needs to be clear on the responsibilities, relationships and accountabilities of external organizations asked to support prison security.

Responsibilities for perimeter security should be clearly established and articulated in operational agreements between those involved, which should address:

- command and decision-making processes and protocols
- information sharing
- joint briefings
- assessment and reassessment of functions
- simulations and contingency planning and practice
- reporting
- performance issues and their resolution
- remuneration
- equipment provision, use, storage and maintenance
- security inspections

Prison management should clearly specify to the external organization the parameters of the support requested, including:

- intent
- strength and command
- duration, rotation, extent of security patrols
- general and specific detailed tasks, including security towers, patrols
- access to the interior of the prison
- escorts
- use of force

General tasks can include:

- ensuring the security of the inner perimeter of the prison
- provision of operational support related to the prevention of escapes
- protection of prison personnel, national prison officers, prisoners and others against imminent threats of death or serious bodily injury

Security tower guard duty

In the list of detailed tasks, security tower guard duty is specified clearly. Each of the functional security towers needs to be clearly identified. This includes those around the perimeter of the prison and those that may be located within the prison compound. Each of the security towers is to be staffed by one officer and each tower is manned around the clock or as specified in the agreement. These officers are rotated regularly. Where allowed / required, each such officer is armed with a firearm and equipped with a handheld radio and a strong torchlight. Where provided, night vision devices are used. Each security tower is equipped with an alarm system, that is, something that makes an efficient sound to alert all security / corrections personnel at the prison.

It is unrealistic in many locations to expect that the prison service could introduce such a detailed process as described above. Staffing one strategic security tower at specified times during the day and at night might be a more realistic goal to strive for in the shorter term.

The officer(s) assigned to the security tower(s) observes the prison and alerts and informs their supervisor immediately if any unusual or significant activity is observed inside the prison that could represent a potential for escape or risk of injury to anyone. In responding, the security tower officer(s) alert all security / corrections personnel by initiating the alarm and communicate the details of the incident or the threat over the radio. In extreme circumstances, they will intervene, including use of firearms if required.

Patrolling the perimeter

Another specific task involves patrolling the inner perimeter. Officers conduct frequent patrols, at least once every hour, around the clock, every day. This patrol is conducted around the inner security corridor of the prison adjacent to the outer perimeter wall.

The perimeter patrol team consists of two officers, who are equipped with at least one means of communication and torchlights.

Their task is to observe the activities of prisoners as well as staff and civilians within the prison. When they observe any unusual behaviour or irregularities that may pose a risk to the overall security of the prison, these are immediately reported to their supervisor. In situations where the threat to security is imminent, such as when a prisoner is attacked by a group of prisoners or a prisoner is scaling the perimeter wall during an escape attempt, the officers may take immediate action to resolve the situation.

At many of the prisons visited, there is no interior security corridor and buildings, trees or equipment often obstruct the view of the perimeter wall / fence / barrier. In these circumstances, it is important to undertake regular inspections to verify the integrity of the interior side of the perimeter wall / fence / barrier and proper installation and functioning of the concertina wire.

Securing the main gate

Securing the main gate is another specific task. One section of the security force, consisting of several members, is positioned between the main gate and the inner gate. The primary task of this group is to secure the main gate 24 hours a day, seven days a week. This group is equipped with riot control equipment. It should also be equipped with firearms, flashlights and handheld radios.

This section of the security force monitors the entry and exit of visitors with the aim of preventing escapes. These members ensure that at no time are the main gate and the inner gate open simultaneously. They may intervene to ensure that the gates are secured if necessary. When they become aware of or observe any attempt at escape, or an intrusion / attack from the exterior, they immediately take action and secure the gates to prevent any prisoner from escaping or any other group from entering the prison.

Prisoner security escort

Providing support for escorting prisoner(s) / detainee(s) securely is an important responsibility. One of the functions of these officers is to provide additional security for prison officers escorting prisoners or detainees to court or hospital.

At the start of, during and at the completion of a prisoner escort, these officers will be in contact with their supervisor and / or the prison director, as the case may be, to provide status reports. They will travel in their own vehicles and closely follow the prison service vehicle(s) carrying the prisoner(s) / detainee(s).

Additional reinforcements

In the case of a major disturbance or a mass escape, the perimeter security supervisor immediately informs their headquarters and will request additional reinforcements.

The perimeter security supervisor ensures that their security personnel have practised quick-reaction drills and that these drills include exercises for accessing weapons and equipment during emergencies.

For each of the specific tasks described above, functions and responsibilities should be clearly identified and should be adjusted as appropriate for a specific prison environment.

Prisoner accommodation

All accommodation for prisoners should be secure and should comply with international prison standards. These areas should include control posts where prison staff can monitor and supervise prisoners. Prisoner accommodation should preferably be brick or concrete block construction with a concrete floor and secure roofs, windows and doors. Cell doors that restrict observation by staff and air circulation should be avoided.

In a number of prisons, prisoners are able to access locking mechanisms on cell doors and barriers, which can present serious security risks. This can be avoided when new cell doors are installed or older ones are repaired. Where this is not possible, prisoners should be directed to move back from the cell door whenever prison staff members are locking or unlocking the cell.

The use of open-hinged cell doors, which can easily be removed, should be avoided. The installation of porcelain toilets and hand basins should be avoided since they can be easily broken and the pieces used as weapons. Where bunk beds are installed, they should be of steel construction, tamper-resistant and fixed to the floor to prevent their use in assisting prisoners during an incident.

Prisoner exercise areas

This is an outdoor area within the perimeter that prisoners can use for recreation under the supervision of prison staff. The entrance should be a secure barrier and the area should be fenced to prevent unauthorized movement.

The number of prisoners allowed in the exercise area at one time should not exceed the prison's capacity to respond should there be any problems. The exercise area should always be searched before and after each exercise period to ensure that the area is secure.

To prevent prisoners from climbing the exercise area fence, one smaller prison's solution was for an officer to be stationed between the exercise area and the exterior perimeter wall with a long stick that could be used to tap a prisoner's fingers if they started to climb the exercise area fence.

In many prisons, the area immediately adjacent to the exercise area fence is out of bounds and if a prisoner enters that area, then a prison staff member blows a whistle and advises the prisoner to move back into the main area.

Visiting areas

The visiting areas should be constructed so as to provide secure access for both visitors and prisoners and to allow for both contact and non-contact visits. This area needs to be secure and monitored during visits to ensure only appropriate contact is allowed and contraband cannot be passed to prisoners. Visiting areas should be searched before and after visits.

Other prison buildings

These areas should be solidly constructed and have bars on the windows and reinforced security doors. They should not be located near prisoner accommodation.

Administration

This may include a number of specialized areas, such as a records office, a place to store prisoner property, etc. Staff and officials such as police, magistrates and legal aid representatives should be able to gain access to this area without passing through the secure area of the prison.

Kitchen

There should be secure food storage areas and a capacity to supervise food preparation and the security of cooking implements, including knives.

Prisoners should not be able to control the amount of food provided to other prisoners or have unrestricted access to food supplies or cooking utensils. Food is a valuable item in prison and may become a means of manipulation and a source of bartering, influence and power.

Maintenance / storage areas

Access to this area needs to be strictly controlled and should not be located in close proximity to prisoner accommodation.

Corrections advisors should assist prison management in developing an inventory of all tools, and a register of who removed tools, for what purpose, and when tools were removed and returned.

Corrections advisors should assist prison management in establishing tool boards ('shadow boards') to allow for the effective detection of removed tools. These boards contain outlines of designated tools to show where they should be stored.

Medical areas

This is an area that prisoners will have access to and will likely include pharmaceuticals (medication), hospital supplies and personal medical records. This area should be constructed to the same standard as a prisoner accommodation building.

Strong medication and patient files need to be properly secured. Prisoner access to this area should be strictly controlled and closely monitored. It is also necessary to establish an accurate record of the type and quantity of medication stored.

Prison stores

Prisoner clothing and prison items (mattresses, bedding, hygiene and cleaning products, etc.) are stored in this area.

Stores items are sought after and need to be strictly controlled and distributed in a fair and equitable fashion. Corrections advisors should assist prison management in developing a system for recording and tracking the issuing of stores items.

Security office

There may be one or more areas where prison staff can monitor communications, use and store recording equipment, and activate and reply to alarms. This is a high-security area within the prison.

The office often becomes the control point during a prison incident and is the central point for communications and the dispatching of staff during incidents. In many prisons, limited equipment is available and staff members rely on their personal cell phones for communications.

Corrections advisors should assist prison management in ensuring this office contains site plans of the prison identifying all buildings, security barriers, vulnerable points, and control points for power and water.

In some prisons, buildings / areas are numbered and visibly identifiable from a distance from both inside and outside the prison. This practice assists external agencies providing support to the prison during an incident.

Utilities plant

Prisons should try to have an alternative power source (a diesel generator, solar power, etc.). There should also be a reliable and independent source of water and adequate sewage infrastructure.

Key control

Key control refers to procedures and practices that ensure prison keys, particularly security keys, are controlled. Procedures and practices should address storage, recording, issuing, receipt and authority to use.

In many prisons in mission areas, prison locks and keys are old and were initially purchased from local markets. These are generally standard “padlocks”, which have only

limited security effectiveness, since they are not designed to resist concerted tampering and the keys can be easily duplicated. Therefore, in many prisons, prison management may not know how many keys exist for a particular lock or who may possess them.

Corrections advisors should assist prison management in replacing those locks where the security integrity is questionable and installing secure storage facilities for unissued keys.

Corrections advisors should assist prison management in and developing a master key register for recording all locks and keys, a daily key issue register for recording the issue and return of keys, and procedures governing the use and control of keys and locks. Corrections advisors should then assist prison management in training staff in the key control procedures.

Prison keys and locks may be classified in one of the following security categories:

1. *very high security* – patented keys and locks with multiple security features, obtainable only from the manufacturer and with keys that can only be duplicated by the manufacturer following authorization
2. *high security* – patented keys and locks with fewer security features and with keys that can only be duplicated by the manufacturer
3. *medium security* – keys and locks that can be purchased from specialist suppliers and that require specialized equipment to duplicate keys
4. *low security* – standard low-quality keys and locks that can be purchased from any retail supplier and with keys that can be easily duplicated

The category of keys and locks applicable to a prison should be determined by the security requirements of the prison and the resources available.

In many prisons in mission areas, the majority of security locks and keys are category 4, with very few in category 3. High and very high security locks and keys are not used.

To compensate for the poor quality and security of keys and ‘padlocks’, corrections advisors should assist prison management in developing effective control procedures and practices, and options such as ‘double-locking’ high-security areas or frequently rotating locks within the prison.

A duplicate set of reserve keys should be stored in a secure location and used to replace lost or damaged keys and locks, and for providing additional security during the management of an incident.

Armoury

This is a secure area where firearms, ammunition, riot equipment and restraints are stored. It requires a very high level of security, including limiting access and installing

additional barriers and locks. It should not be located in an area generally accessible by prisoners.

In many prisons in mission areas, the location of the armoury is inappropriate and vulnerable. Firearms are poorly stored and need repair. Ammunition is not accounted for or separated from firearms, and armouries are often disorganized, which affects quick access to equipment.

Corrections advisors should assist prison management in developing procedures and practices to record an inventory of all equipment, staff access to the area, the issuing and return of equipment, and approvals required for issuing this equipment.

B. Incident management

Effective incident management requires the ability to accurately assess the nature and scope of the incident and the risks involved; quickly contain and control the incident area; continue to operate the rest of the prison; determine the appropriate intervention strategy / options (using proportionality, meaning the nature or amount of force used should be proportional to the need); intervene effectively to resolve the incident; and then follow a plan to resume normal prison routines.

Throughout the phases of an incident the focus should be on preservation of life and the safety of staff, prisoners and visitors, and these objectives should be reinforced regularly with prison staff through regular training, visual posters, etc.

The following steps are universal and can be applied to both serious and less serious incidents in any type of prison:

- immediately respond
- isolate and contain
- report and record information
- identify response resources
- manage the incident
- resume normal prison routines
- review actions

1. Respond

The ability of prison staff to respond to an incident and resolve it before it escalates, depends on:

- **timeliness** – the ability of prison staff to quickly access the incident scene will depend on the location of the incident within the prison and the ability to open barriers, doors, etc. Access to security keys is a critical factor.

- capacity to respond – depends on:
 - the availability of equipment necessary to initially deal with an incident (keys, restraints, communications, fire equipment, etc.)
 - the number of staff available
 - staff knowledge and skills

2. Isolate and contain

Prison staff members who initially respond to an incident should resolve the incident when possible. When this is not possible, prison staff members should isolate and contain the area to prevent the incident from escalating by securing prisoners, restricting movement, obtaining additional staff support, etc.

When an incident cannot be resolved initially, prison management (i.e., the prison director and key managers) should cordon off the incident scene and increase the security of the prison by deploying additional staff to key security positions, securing all prisoners and ceasing prisoner movement, removing visitors, etc. Such actions reinforce the containment area and ensure the security of other parts of the prison. Depending on the design of the prison, this may not be easily achievable. Nonetheless, the perimeter of the prison must be secured and protected. The more information staff members have about the nature of an incident, the more weaknesses in prison security infrastructure can be addressed.

Vulnerable prisoners such as women, juveniles, and mentally ill or physically disabled prisoners, should be specifically protected and may need to be moved to alternative locations (internal or external).

3. Report and record

Depending on the type of incident, prison management should gather key information, including:

- have prisoners been provided with clear directions regarding their behaviour and the consequences for non-compliance?
- do prisoners have weapons and, if so what type and how many?
- are there hostages (staff, other prisoners, visitors)?
- are there any injuries or deaths?
- who are the identified focal prisoners?
- is there a risk of escape?
- is there any infrastructure damage?

Incident recording should include:

- details of the incident
- initial responses
- external organizations involved
- the actions of all participants and the timing of these actions
- resolution of the incident
- injuries, damage, etc.
- operational impact of the incident on the prison

Detailed incident recording forms the basis of the incident management review and the report to prison headquarters once the incident is resolved that is discussed in step 7 of this model.

4. Identify response resources

If an incident cannot be resolved internally, depending on the nature of the incident and the risks involved, prison management may seek assistance from external organizations (police, fire services, etc.) to either supplement or replace prison staff in managing the incident. External organizations may not be familiar with the operation or layout of the prison and should be fully briefed prior to any intervention. In such cases, the role of prison staff is primarily to manage those parts of the prison not affected by the incident.

5. Manage the incident

Depending on the type of incident, there are usually two ways to resolve an incident:

- through negotiation (this should be the primary focus)
- through tactical intervention (use of force)

Prison management should be able to easily access key information to assist in managing the incident, including:

- contact lists for external support organizations (police, fire services, medical services, etc.) who can respond on request
- plans of the prison, which include key security elements
- reporting templates
- key policies and procedures relevant to the incident
- roles and responsibilities of key participants

This information should be prepared in advance and easily assessable in the event of an incident.

For serious incidents, and where time permits, prison management should also develop an intervention plan, including specifying the amount of force required to resolve the incident. The elements contained in a contingency plan prepared in advance can be used to prepare an intervention plan to address a specific incident.

The primary focus of an intervention plan should be negotiation aimed at resolving the incident quickly and with minimal negative impact. Prison management needs to designate specific staff to carry out three key functions:

- *incident manager* – designated by prison management to implement the intervention and contingency plans
- *head of the intervention team* – prison staff and / or external support organizations (police, fire services, negotiators, etc.)
- *prison security officer* – designated by prison management to ensure the security of the rest of the prison

Where possible, an incident command centre should be established in a safe location and in close proximity to the incident scene. The incident manager should be based in this location.

Access to and from the containment area should be strictly controlled: only prison staff and authorized persons should have access. Where prison staff numbers are limited, the intervention team may also be required to supplement prison security. Any injured persons should be removed as soon as possible from the incident scene and referred to medical services.

6. Resume normal prison routines

Once the incident has been resolved, the next step is to re-establish normal routines. This step includes immediate and subsequent actions, which should be clearly identified, including:

- restoring normal prisoner daily routines (food, exercise, hygiene, visits, health care, access to courts, etc.)
- restoring normal daily staff activities

7. Review actions

Prison management should ensure that key participants review all serious incidents once the incident is resolved. This review should focus on successful or unsuccessful

actions, lessons learned and gaps identified in the capacity of participants to respond (procedures, training etc.). In addition, the review should identify and investigate any alleged excessive use of force or other violations by participants in responding to and resolving the incident and hold those responsible accountable. Prisoners who actively participated in the incident are identified and consequences determined including initiating criminal charges.

The accuracy and degree of detail of the information recorded during the incident is critical when reviewing the incident and debriefing participants. Although information may initially be communicated verbally, a written record should be made for future reference and accountability. A copy of this report is then forwarded to prison headquarters.

C. Use of force

There are no specific international standards for the use of force for prison staff in the context of prison security. However, national authorities may have their own use of force policies or frameworks. The purpose of this section is to suggest a use of force continuum relevant for national prison authorities in the management of prison incidents within an organizational and accountability framework.

This section has therefore been based on the:

- United Nations *Code of Conduct for Law Enforcement Officials* adopted by General Assembly resolution 34/169 of 17 December 1979
- United Nations *Basic Principles on the Use of Force and Firearms by Law Enforcement Officials* adopted by the Eighth United Nations Congress on the Prevention of Crime and the Treatment of Offenders, Havana, Cuba, 27 August to 7 September 1990
- United Nations Policy on *Formed Police Units in United Nations Peacekeeping Operations* approved by the United Nations Department of Peacekeeping Operations, Department of Field Support, Ref. 2009.32 of 1 March 2010

The above-mentioned code of conduct, principles and policy provides a foundation from which United Nations Corrections Advisors can support the development of a national prison 'use of force' strategy. It is particularly important to consider the principles of 'use of force' as illustrated in the United Nations Policy on Formed Police Units in United Nations Peacekeeping Operations.

The United Nations Policy on Formed Police Units in United Nations Peacekeeping Operations bases its guidance on the 'use of force' on the principles of necessity, proportionality / minimum level of force, legality and accountability. The overarching concept is to protect and preserve human life, property, liberty and dignity.¹⁵

¹⁵ United Nations Department of Peacekeeping Operations, Department of Field Support, *Policy (Revised): Formed Police Units in United Nations Peacekeeping Operations*, March 2010.

The principle of *necessity* stipulates that the all non-violent means of resolution must be considered prior to resorting to 'use of force' and firearms. The use of lethal force and physical handling should, at all times, be a last resort and only used when all other lesser force options including verbal direction and staff presence have been exhausted. Prison staff should use only as much force as is considered, in good faith and on reasonable grounds, to be necessary to resolve an incident.

The principle of *proportionality / minimum use of force* stipulates that whenever the 'use of force' is necessary, law enforcement officials shall only use as much force as is required to stop the displayed behaviour.

The principle of *legality* stipulates that law enforcement officials shall never operate outside of the legislation that governs them. Therefore, for national authorities, the 'use of force' for prison officers should be addressed within national legislation. National prison staff should never use force outside the national legal frameworks and all use of force must be in accordance with human rights norms and standards.

The principle of *accountability* entails that law enforcement officials shall at all times fulfil the duty imposed upon them by the law, by servicing the community and by protecting all persons against illegal acts, consistent with the high degree of responsibility required by their profession. If and when a 'use of force' has occurred, the incident must be reported to a superior and any arbitrary or abusive 'use of force' must be punishable under the law.

Use of force continuum

A use of force continuum is a model that helps law enforcement officials consider reasonable force options and the degree of force to be considered in response to current prisoner behaviour.

Each level in the continuum is relative to a corresponding level of prison behaviour or resistance. Prison staff may find that a resistant prisoner responds appropriately to a lesser force option and that the situation can be resolved with less force than initially anticipated.

While the specific progression of force varies considerably based on prisoner behaviour and resources available, normally the use of force progression is as follows:¹⁶

1. *Staff presence* – No specific force is used. This is considered a show of force. This is the desired way to resolve a situation.
 - the presence of prison officers deters or diffuses the situation
 - staff attitudes should be professional and non-threatening

16 National Institute of Justice website, "The Use-of-Force Continuum," August 2009, accessed May 2012.

2. *Verbalization* – Force is not physical.
 - prison officers issue calm, non-threatening commands, such as “Where you are going?” or “What is happening here?”
 - prison officers may increase the volume of their voice and shorten commands (“Stop” or “Don’t move”) to gain compliance
 - warnings and direct orders can be used to gain prisoner compliance (“do something or force options will be used”)
3. *Empty-hand control (no force equipment used)* – Prison officers physically control the prisoner. They can use grabs, holds and joint locks to restrain or control a prisoner.
4. *Non-lethal force* – Prison officers use non-lethal tools to stop prisoner behaviour and gain control of the prisoner.
 - Baton – staff members use a baton or shield to stop prisoner behaviour and gain control of a prisoner
 - Pepper spray or similar – staff members use pepper spray to stop prisoner behaviour and gain control of a prisoner
5. *Lethal force* – Prison services that are armed and prison officers properly trained to use firearms could consider the use of lethal force (firearms) to stop prisoner behaviour in order to protect life. However, if the use of firearm is considered an acceptable force option based on prisoner behaviour, the following **MUST** be considered;
 - use of firearms must in compliance with national legislation
 - use of lethal force should only be considered in self-defence, to stop grievous bodily harm or imminent death,
 - use of lethal force should only be considered when all other lesser force options have been exhausted
 - if time permits, the firearm should be displayed and a verbal warning provided to the prisoner
 - if time permits, a warning shot into a safe area should be fired
 - if lethal force is considered an option, the intent should only be to stop the behaviour interpreted as a threat to life.

“Officers of the institutions shall not, in their relations with the prisoners, use force except in self-defence or in cases of attempted escape, or active or passive physical resistance to an order based on law or regulations. Officers who have recourse to force must use no more than is strictly necessary and must report the incident immediately to the director of the institution.”

United Nations, *Standard Minimum Rules for the Treatment of Prisoners*, adopted by the First United Nations Congress on the Prevention of Crime and the Treatment of Offenders, Geneva, 1955, Rule 54 (1)

“Staff in direct contact with prisoners should not usually be armed.”

United Nations, Standard Minimum Rules for the Treatment of Prisoners, adopted by the First United Nations Congress on the Prevention of Crime and the Treatment of Offenders, Geneva, 1955, rule 54(3)¹

“Law enforcement officials shall not use firearms against persons except in self-defence or defence of others against the imminent threat of death or serious injury, to prevent the perpetration of a particularly serious crime involving grave threat to life, to arrest a person presenting such a danger and resisting their authority, or to prevent his or her escape, and only when less extreme means are insufficient to achieve these objectives. In any event, intentional lethal use of firearms may only be made when strictly unavoidable in order to protect life.”

United Nations, Basic Principles on the Use of Force and Firearms by Law Enforcement Officials, adopted by the Eighth United Nations Congress on the Prevention of Crime and the Treatment of Prisoners, Havana, Cuba, 27 August to 7 September 1990, Principle (9)

Although various criminal justice agencies have developed continuum models, and the United Nations has developed rules and principles, there is no standard operational model for the use of force for prison officers to which United Nations Corrections Advisors can refer in order to advise national prison authorities.

Nonetheless, support for a use of force continuum by prison management can contribute to prison officers being able to resolve incidents without reverting to potentially lethal interventions. While force may be necessary, emphasis should be on negotiation and conflict resolution. That said, time may often be an important factor in resolving prison incidents and in some circumstances may not allow for protracted or extended negotiations.

Corrections advisors should assist prison management in developing a staff training curriculum that includes specific use of force techniques within a straightforward and pragmatic problem-solving framework. It should guide prison staff in analysing incidents and determining the most appropriate responses and interventions.

To guide prison staff in the management of incidents, prison management should develop clear policies and procedures dealing with the use of force. These should address:

- the type and degree of force to be used (based on the continuum)
- specific circumstances for using force
- personnel trained and authorized to use force
- equipment authorized when using force

- reporting and accountability mechanisms, including reviewing all non-lethal and lethal use of force incidents
- health care follow up after every use of force incident

Without a continuum in place, prison staff may tend to use force as the first response when addressing prison incidents, by relying on threats of physical force and the use of restraints as a response to inappropriate prisoner behaviour. There is little transition or middle ground between a verbal command and a physical intervention. This is generally due to the lack of capacity by prison staff to resolve issues without physical confrontation.

As a priority, corrections advisors should assist prison management in developing a use of force framework and related training, based on use of force policies, procedures and legislation, where they exist. Where they do not exist, corrections advisors should assist prison management in their development.

Corrections advisors should assist prison management in identifying prison staff members with good communication and negotiation skills to assist in managing incidents.

Corrections advisors should also assist prison management in introducing performance indicators to monitor the frequency and nature of use of force interventions, so as to better understand the extent to which use of force is required to manage the prison.

If not directed in national legislation, the use of lethal force to prevent escapes should only be considered when less lethal interventions are considered inappropriate depending on time and resources available. Access to and strict control of restraint equipment should be clearly defined in prison policies and procedures, and reinforced by United Nations corrections advisors. Only trained prison staff should have access to such equipment.

Prison security staff should not, as a general rule, have access to lethal weapons. In environments where prison officers have firearms, these should only be used:¹⁷

- in self-defence or the defence of others against the imminent threat of death or serious injury
- to prevent the perpetration of a particularly serious crime involving grave threat to life
- to prevent an escape, and only when less extreme means are insufficient to achieve these objectives

In prisons where firearms exist, corrections advisors should assist prison management in providing training and sensitization on this principle, have it translated into the local language, and provide copies to all staff with access to firearms.

¹⁷ United Nations, *Basic Principles on the Use of Force and Firearms by Law Enforcement Officials*, adopted by the Eighth United Nations Congress on the Prevention of Crime and the Treatment of Prisoners, Havana, Cuba, 27 August to 7 September 1990, Principle 9.

Restraints may be used to prevent an escape, particularly when escorting prisoners outside the prison. They should be applied for no longer than is necessary to address the risk and should be removed when a prisoner appears in court or administrative authority, or where medically required.

Corrections advisors should also assist prison management in developing prisoner escort procedures that cover these requirements and these should be verified regularly. An escort report, which includes recording the use of restraints, should be developed.

Prison policies and procedures should also clearly state that restraints should never be applied as a punishment. Chains and leg irons should not be used as restraints.

It is desirable to allow prisoners freedom of movement within a controlled and defined space. If a prison uses such restraints, corrections advisors should assist prison management in developing alternative actions to ensure the security of such prisoners. This may require identifying funding to improve security infrastructure, the deployment of additional prison staff, etc.

Use of force in a problem-solving context

The development and introduction of a problem-solving framework relevant to prisons is a cornerstone of effective prisoner management. Many prison systems have developed frameworks that include steps in assessing a security-related situation.

Corrections advisors in one mission use the following problem-solving model:

- stop
- think
- observe
- plan and develop options – courses of action
- evaluate each course of action
- determine and execute the chosen course of action
- reassess the impact and adjust the course of action accordingly

International human rights principles, especially in relation to use of force, should be clearly established in policy, taught in prison recruit training and reinforced in various refresher training sessions. Each use of force policy and training programme should specifically refer to the relevant standards and human rights principles on the treatment of prisoners.

Use of force training should also include the context and conditions under which restraint equipment may be used in a prison. It appears that some prison staff training,

for example on the use of batons, is not specific to prisons and has been adapted from police. This may be the only source of training material available; however, it is preferable if use of force trainers have had prison experience.

In some prisons, restraint equipment is issued to prison staff without appropriate training or policies and procedures being developed. Corrections advisors should assist prison management in addressing these issues, including a process to control access to restraint equipment.

Corrections advisors should assist prison management in providing timely and focused training whenever a policy or new item of security / restraint equipment is introduced, and this should be clearly linked to a use of force continuum and problem-solving framework.

Corrections advisors should assist prison management in developing a system to record each use of force involving the physical handling of a prisoner, and a process for reviewing all non-lethal and lethal use of force interventions. This should include a staff disciplinary process if it is determined that the use of force was inappropriate or excessive.

Authority for the use of force

Where an intervention plan is developed to address a specific type of serious prison incident, it should prescribe the degree and type of force to be used by trained prison staff members and authorize them to use it.

Any unplanned and spontaneous use of force by prison staff should be anchored in existing prison policies and procedures and the training received. Such use of force is characterized by:

- its unpredictability
- the lack of time to develop an approved intervention plan

The success of a use of force intervention relies heavily on:

- the training and capacity of prison staff
- the specific requirements of an intervention plan
- effective communication
- leadership

Managing vulnerable prisoners

There are special considerations when dealing with vulnerable prisoners (women, juveniles, mentally ill prisoners, etc.) during an incident. Use of force, including restraints, should not be applied to such prisoners, unless no other option exists for their management.

Special attention should be given to a pregnant women prisoner to ensure that any technique or intervention used will not inadvertently affect the foetus. Restraint equipment should only be used as a last resort for pregnant women. The application of restraints and certain use of force techniques may provoke or increase the chance of miscarriage or harm to the foetus. If a woman prisoner is restrained, staff should support her by the arms when moving from one location to another and care should be taken to ensure that no pressure is exerted on the stomach or chest. A medical practitioner should determine and advise on the use of restraint equipment.

Example: Use of Force Intervention Model – Situation, Mission, Execution, Administration, Communication (SMEAC)¹⁸

This intervention model contains five elements and was prepared using information from a number of key sources.

Situation

The incident manager or equivalent should provide a summary of the incident and be able to answer the following:

- have prisoners received an order to cease their activities?
- have the consequences of not obeying this order been clearly stated to prisoners?
- what are the details of the incident and the location within the prison?
- are prisoners armed and, if so, what weapons are involved and how many?
- are there hostages, and if so, how many and where are they?
- what are the names of the key agitators/instigators?
- are there any injuries to staff, prisoners or others?
- are there other prisoners not directly involved in the incident and, if so, where are they and what are they doing?
- does the situation present an escape risk?
- has the prison infrastructure or critical security equipment been damaged or manipulated?

Mission

The anticipated results of the intervention should be clearly described, as well as any restrictions that apply. This is to ensure the intervention is well defined and authorities are clear.

Execution

The following questions should be addressed:

- how and when will the intervention plan be initiated?
- what is the role of each prison staff member in the intervention plan (equipment required, use of force, etc.)?
- how will prisoners be managed once they have been restrained and secured?

Administration

The intervention plan should clearly identify the equipment to be used and by whom. Each prison staff member involved in the intervention should report to the incident manager and detail their involvement and actions (verbally or in writing) once the incident is under control.

¹⁸ The SMEAC approach / model is used by many security and disaster response organizations.

Communication

The intervention plan should clearly describe the chain of command and the communication mechanisms and protocols to be observed.

Prison systems may already have SMEAC action plans on file, which were established for incidents that occurred previously. These SMEAC plans can be used to conduct realistic table-top exercises at the prison during periods of less activity.

There may be more than one intervention plan: each plan should be authorized by the same person, preferably the prison director, who should ensure there are no contradictions or overlaps in the plans, and that their sequencing and timing is clear and understood by all involved.

Although the scope and limitations of the use of force in serious prison incidents may seem clear in policy, they are often best understood by a trained intervention team comprised of staff members who have experience working together and understand exactly what is expected of them.

Strict command and control is often required in stressful and difficult-to-control situations where prison staff members may intentionally or inadvertently take matters into their own hands, abuse their authority or disregard the actions of colleagues.

Table-top exercises or simulations allow staff members to gain an understanding of the capacity of those involved and allow them to better follow direction, exercise judgement and act accordingly.

Example: Situation, Mission, Execution, Administration, Communication (SMEAC) Action Plan

(This example can be modified depending on the size and complexity of the prison)

Date:	Start Time:	Prison:	
Intervention leader:		Incident manager:	
Negotiator (if assigned):			
SITUATION – Type of incident:			
Persons directly involved	Id No.	Role in the incident	Area contained and secure: <input type="checkbox"/> No <input type="checkbox"/> Yes When:
Location of incident:			
No. of persons involved: Prisoners: Staff: Visitors:		Injuries: Prisoners: Staff: Visitors:	
Violence or weapons used? <input type="checkbox"/> No <input type="checkbox"/> Yes <input type="checkbox"/> Unknown		Specify:	
Emotional and physical condition of those involved:			
Negotiation commenced <input type="checkbox"/> No <input type="checkbox"/> Yes Time:		Negotiation actions and results:	
Medical issues determined: <input type="checkbox"/> No <input type="checkbox"/> Yes		Type of medical issue:	
MISSION – Statement of primary objective			
EXECUTION			
<ul style="list-style-type: none">● Step-by-step plan to resolve the incident, addressing:● Why take action now rather than later?● Does the plan minimize injury and loss of life?● Is the plan legal?● Nature and extent of verbal communication with prisoners?● What actions are to be taken if prisoners are compliant or non-compliant?● What level of force is to be used and what equipment is required?			
Briefing provided to intervention team by:			
Name:		Date:	Time:

Part A: Immediate intervention actions (e.g., set-up, containment, evacuation, etc.)		
Part B: Alternative actions (several options should be identified depending on how the incident develops)		
Authority to use force		
Level of force	Yes	Prison director signature
Team presence and verbal commands	<input type="checkbox"/>	
Physical contact (grabs, holds, etc.)	<input type="checkbox"/>	
Restraints (handcuffs, etc.)	<input type="checkbox"/>	
Riot equipment (shields, batons, etc.)	<input type="checkbox"/>	
Other	<input type="checkbox"/>	
ADMINISTRATION List support services required for the incident (e.g., site plans, prisoner photos, food, police support, etc.):		
Administrative support (technical services, food, water, electricity, etc.):		
Use of prison staff (e.g., relief/rotation, etc.):		
External support organizations (police, fire services, medical services, etc.):		
COMMUNICATION Methods and protocols for communication to and from the incident manager		
Verbal commands:	Non-verbal signals:	
Plan developed by the incident manager	Plan approved by the prison director	
Name:	Name:	
Signature:	Signature:	
Date:	Date:	

Annexes

A



Annex 1. Common Causes of Major Disturbances, Riots and Mass Escapes

The purpose of this annex is to underscore and outline the multitude of factors and forces that can provoke or feed prisoner unrest, hostility and ultimately major security incidents. It focuses on several of the overarching elements that are seen as common and often contribute to prison unrest.

Effective management of prisoners on a daily basis and from a security perspective is based on two key areas of focus: good order and control. They will not, in and of themselves, address all of the causes that contribute to prison incidents, but do provide a stable and core base on which prisons should operate.

It is known that the contributors to / causes of frequent prison disturbances and escapes include:

A. Systemic factors

- **Blockages in the Criminal Justice System.** These give rise to prolonged pre-trial detention without an expectation of a future court appearance. Other criminal justice factors include arbitrary detention, disproportionate sentencing, and inability of prisoners to pay fines and compensation. Unclear delineation between criminal and civil matters is also an issue.

In many post-conflict countries, one of the most serious problems relates to the prolonged periods of detention with no formalized system to actively review and refer cases back to the courts, police and prosecutors for disposition.

- **Overcrowding.** This can be a key factor in incidents although it is not necessarily, in itself, the single cause of serious incidents. It is a contributing factor that provokes tensions in a prison and can be the catalyst for an incident.

Overcrowding can also compromise efforts to effectively classify prisoners into categories, and to separate women and juveniles from men. The effect of overcrowding, coupled with the lack of the basic essentials of life, can create a situation where prisoners feel helpless and may revert to extreme means to obtain food and water. It also affects human dignity and the ability of prisoners to conduct the activities of daily living (sleeping, hygiene, etc.) with a modicum of privacy.

Larger prisons are more vulnerable in this regard, since the physical infrastructure and staffing levels do not always compensate or adjust effectively to increased prisoner population levels.

B. Management factors

- **Gaps in Organizational Structure.** An organizational structure in the prison service that does not have in place a set of security procedures, or specific reporting and monitoring requirements with a focus on security, will have less capacity to prevent, anticipate or respond effectively to incidents.

In some countries, all of the necessary policies have been developed but still need to be approved by the authorities or be implemented. Without these policies and related training in place, staff members cannot be held accountable for their conduct.

- **Absence of Effective Prison Security Procedures and Prison Intelligence.** Basic security procedures include proper search techniques, a search plan for the entire prison, ongoing monitoring and analysis of prisoners' behaviour, and an ability to establish adequate controls for prisoner movement and activities. The importance of an active security focus within a prison cannot be overstated. It is a key element in the prevention of major prison incidents and mass escapes. The passive and reactive relationship that can exist between prison officers and prisoners results in prisoners having considerable control and influence as to what happens within the prison.

Some prisons have basic security procedures in place; however, they frequently lack consistent application and active vigilance by security staff. Officers are not always at key security posts, and are not actively monitoring or assessing prisoner movements or behaviour. There is little capacity to identify security threats, dangerous situations or plans to escape. This is complicated at certain prisons because of the existing prison configuration and overcrowded conditions.

- **Prison Authorities Ill Prepared to Respond to Major Incidents.** Prison authorities may be ill prepared to respond to major destabilizing and / or life-threatening incidents for a number of reasons. These could include a lack of training, inappropriate staff or staffing levels, lack of specific equipment, and non-existent, poorly coordinated or incomplete response capacities. Roles and responsibilities need to be clearly understood for interventions to be effective.

In many prison systems, there are a number of agreements and protocols should a prison need additional help in responding to a major incident. Unfortunately, many of these are very general in nature and do not cover all possible scenarios. In the countries visited, protocols covering major emergencies or incidents appeared to vary greatly and were not consistently known at the operational level.

- **Reluctance of National Authorities to Take Ownership of the Prison System.** The ability of international organizations to assist countries in conflict in an effective

manner is dependent on the quality and strength of national institutions in each country, and on their ability and commitment to engage and respond to challenges. Building sustainable capacity is the ultimate goal.

- **Lack of or Weak Oversight, Transparency and Accountability Mechanisms.** In many prison systems, there is still a need to develop accountability measures for prison staff. Accurate reporting and oversight of prison operations is a major challenge and will need to be developed with the commitment of all concerned.

C. Resource factors

- **Insufficient and Poorly Trained Prison Staff.** Without sufficient staff, prisoners can control a prison. In many post-conflict countries, prison officers are former police or militia. The specific competencies and qualifications of prison officers are different from those of police or military officers, and the differences need to be well understood at the time of selection / recruitment, as well as in developing appropriate training for prison staff.

In many post-conflict countries, the prison service is under the jurisdiction of national police, which can delay the development of skills and competencies specific to corrections.

- **Poor Working Conditions for Prison Staff.** In some countries, prison staff members are not remunerated on a regular basis, and do not have proper uniforms or equipment to carry out their basic security duties. This gives rise to corruption, which can lead to contraband (drugs, weapons, mobile phones, etc.) being smuggled into prisons with the knowledge of staff.

Prison staff members are often exposed to exactly the same living conditions as the prisoners, which has an impact on the quality of their performance and their interactions with prisoners. Such conditions cannot help but adversely affect the morale and overall motivation of staff.

In some countries, prison staff members have uniforms and equipment, and staff members reliably report for work. In other countries, however, this is not the case. Prison staff members often have little equipment and few administrative tools to work with. They either do not report consistently to work or leave the prison during work hours without approval. Office space is inadequate or non-existent.

- **Inadequate Logistics for Prison Management.** Prisons need to have the necessary logistical support, technology and equipment to allow them to respond to daily concerns and issues, as well as to respond effectively to major destabilizing incidents in a prison.

In many post-conflict prison environments, basic communications systems exist, even if only whistles and / or staff members' personal cell phones, but other essential equipment, such as generators and vehicles, are often in need of repair or non-existent.

- **Unsanitary Conditions and the Prevalence of Diseases.** Depending on the prison's population levels, as well as on the nature and extent of national and international funding, the poor health conditions of prisoners can create an environment that allows for the transmission of diseases.

Prisons are often susceptible to the outbreak of contagious diseases at any time and generally have difficulty maintaining a clean, hygienic environment. Toilet facilities are of special concern, as is the removal of septic waste. Personal hygiene products are generally not provided or easily available for prisoners to use.

- **Inadequate Food Supplies for Prisoners.** A basic issue affecting prisons in many countries is the ability to provide enough food for prisoners on a daily basis. Families and community-based organizations are often relied upon to fully provide or supplement food for prisoners. Although inappropriate, this type of community contact and commitment is invaluable and does keep the connection between prisoners and the community alive. It is understandable that prisoners who are starving may escape so they can eat. The daily feeding of prisoners varies a great deal from one mission to another.

The ongoing preparation and provision of nutritious food is an area where continued vigilance will be required.

- **Inadequate Health Care.** Without adequate health care, the ongoing management and identification of disease is ineffective. There is a serious challenge in combating TB and HIV / AIDS, which are predominant in many post-conflict countries. It is important that the prison has an arrangement with local health-care services if it cannot treat a prisoner on site.

Many prisons face a continuing challenge in maintaining a disease-free environment. If provision of basic health-care services is not assured, disease can be widespread. It is particularly difficult to prevent infection and the spread of disease in a prison environment.

- **Weak Physical Prison Infrastructure.** In many instances, the prison infrastructure is weak, destroyed or inadequate. Improvements in infrastructure need to be coordinated with proper training of staff and the development of policies that ensure prison security. At many prisons, there is a weak or non-existent security perimeter. The accumulation of deficiencies in infrastructure increases security risks in a prison.

In many prisons, there is little capacity to isolate and contain prisoners should the need arise or their security risk merit such control. Similarly, there is little ability to effectively separate and protect different categories of prisoners, especially vulnerable prisoners such as females, juveniles, and those with mental illnesses or physical disabilities.

- **Limited Capacity-building Resources Committed by Donor Countries/National Governments.** In many post-conflict countries, the protracted humanitarian crisis

no longer attracts significant international attention. Prison services are often less likely than other services to receive support from national governments, since they are generally considered a lower priority.

Little attention is paid to national authorities' capacity to process remand prisoners in a timely manner or to keep these people safely in custody. Prolonged detentions due to poorly functioning justice systems can be a significant cause of prison incidents in post-conflict settings.

D. Core contributors

Riots and mass escapes call into question the capacity of a prison service to manage prisoners effectively. Correctional research has identified several core factors that affect prisoner behaviour and their ability / capacity to accept the conditions of confinement.

These include:

- lack of contact or engagement of staff
- different / preferential relationships between staff and prisoners
- internal conflicts between prison officers and management
- a rapid influx of new prisoners
- major changes in daily routines, policies or rules without proper notification
- conflicting political, ethnic or religious affiliations, which are very common in post-conflict contexts

It is essential that prison officers demonstrate to prisoners that they are in charge of the prison and that they take an active interest in ensuring the safety of all concerned and in upholding basic human rights for all prisoners.

These factors underscore the critical importance of staff presence in observing / analysing prisoner behaviour on a continuous basis. Changes in prisoner relationships, associations or behaviours can be symptomatic of the potential for conflicts between prisoners, or between prisoners and staff, which may result in prison incidents. In situations where there are a large number of prisoners, few staff and little documentation, it becomes difficult to assess each prisoner, including their demeanour, as to the level of security risk they represent.

Annex 2. Lessons Learned and Recommendations from Mission Visits

The visits to four different DPKO missions provided a useful representation of issues facing prison systems in post-conflict countries. It became evident that there is no clearly established model or process within mission corrections components to integrate “lessons learned” into their capacity-building work.

Each significant event or activity needs to be evaluated by asking a standard set of questions. The answers to these will hopefully encourage a continuous learning process for all involved.

- What worked well . . . or did not work well?
- What needs to be done over or done differently
- What unanticipated events occurred?
- Were the goals or objectives achieved?
- If not, what factors played a key role and influence?

A. Executive summary of lessons learned

1. Capacity-building

Capacity-building is about relationships, mutual learning and focus. In the missions visited, the extent to which corrections advisors were able to develop a productive and meaningful relationship with national prison counterparts varied. The more structure and planning that can be introduced into this relationship, the more critical areas can be approached and common strategies developed.

The extent to which the needs of women and other vulnerable groups were taken into account also varied, with the majority of efforts being in the area of training rather than in the development of policies. The “Bangkok Rules” were still somewhat underused in certain missions and need to be more actively integrated into policy and operational practices. The application of the “Beijing Rules” for juveniles varied greatly depending on the availability of resources and existence of specific policies.

Because trust and confidence between prison management and corrections advisors develops over time, embedding an advisor is one way of ensuring a constant and sustained focus on certain issues, as well as enabling a better understanding of the political and government environment in which the prison administration operates.

Building an ongoing and productive relationships with the judiciary is also an important strategy to help address overcrowding and delays in the handling of detention cases.

For a prison service to move forward, it needs the support of the national government and to be part of the budget allocation process. National prison services need to develop their capacity to prepare and present reports that link their resource needs to international standards and public safety. Budget and planning documents are also very useful in seeking donor support and cooperation with other criminal justice players. Critical in this process is the development of a set of performance indicators that demonstrate an active interest in accountability and performance improvement.

In some missions, the capacity of corrections advisors is limited, depending on the logistical support they receive from the mission, the prison service and other partners. Co-location is one of the most effective ways to influence behaviour and affect change, through daily presence at the prison, involvement in its operations and the ability to respond immediately when issues arise or advice is requested. Logistical support includes vehicles, office space, telecommunications equipment, and the availability of national corrections advisors and their resources. Prison infrastructure needs to be inspected by engineers with a practical knowledge of prison operations; these engineers need to be in place and to be supported in their work.

One area that remains a challenge is the development and application of tools to measure / assess the extent to which corrections advisors' capacity-building efforts are effective in the long term and can be sustained by the prison service over time. When prisons have been operating free of incidents, it is harder to measure the actual impact of the capacity-building efforts undertaken. In many instances, the daily presence and involvement of corrections advisors has unintentionally developed into co-dependency, the impact of which is only discovered once the advisors leave. A strategy and process needs to be developed to address co-dependency.

The use of simulations, table-top exercises and role playing can provide useful indicators of actual transfer of skills. Prison staff members need to develop a culture in which they regularly remind themselves of key responsibilities and reflect on their performance, not only when prison incidents occur. Checklists and self-assessment tools are a useful way of encouraging this reflection.

In many post-conflict countries, prison staff members are not guided by an approved code of conduct or a clear set of accountability mechanisms. Often, the sanctions applied against staff are poorly understood, inconsistent and not aimed at improvement. Prison administrations need to develop and consistently implement staff discipline processes to deal with staff members who disregard or breach procedures.

2. Security policies and procedures

A wide variety of static security measures are being used in post-conflict prison environments, often as a result of the experience of those funding a proposal or of the contractor who completed the work. Concertina wire, cell doors, perimeter walls and security towers, exercise yards and visiting areas all varied greatly. In many of these areas, a set of universal standards need to be established.

In addition, little attention is paid to either regular inspection of security infrastructure or its maintenance. In these situations, the use of dynamic security and modified security procedures and practices can mitigate the effects of weak infrastructure.

A number of resource documents and manuals have been developed to support and guide the corrections advisors in their efforts. For whatever reason, these documents seem to be rarely used or unknown to a large number of corrections advisors and national prison staff. Greater efforts to integrate these documents into discussions and to provide support materials to prison services would be beneficial.

Without the benefit of these documents, corrections advisors tend to rely on their own individual experiences, acquired in a particular country or countries. Since experiences vary widely, relying solely on them can create a lack of consistency and perhaps confusion for national prison staff. More importantly, advisors' experiences do not necessarily reflect United Nations and international standards.

A more active and constant focus needs to be placed on dynamic security in many prisons. The concept and application of dynamic security seems unclear or counter-productive to many national prison staff. If staff members are not directed or expected to interact with prisoners, and if they do not feel comfortable in doing so, the overall security of the prison could be compromised. Staff members need to know what prisoners are planning, how they feel about their circumstances and how they plan to cope with prison.

Searching of the prison needs to be given a higher priority. Conditions of overcrowding do not help, but some prison staff members appear to be reluctant to search. Searching and search techniques can be modified to address cultural differences, but they need to be completed in both a planned and spontaneous fashion. Search plans need to be established, and search locations and frequency need to be specified.

3. Security training

Use of force training specific to a prison environment needs to be provided to prison staff as early as possible. This is not always the case. This type of training needs to be placed in the larger context of problem-solving techniques and dynamic and static security measures. Staff members need to be provided with regular opportunities to practise their training and be involved in contingency planning and scenario or table-

top exercises. Prison management at each prison needs to provide time for this type of refresher training.

4. Security reviews and analysis.

A prison service needs to know what its capacity is to respond to and manage prison incidents. To do this, it needs to know if its policies, staff presence and training are adequate for this purpose. A capacity to systematically review incidents, identify problems and find solutions is essential.

An effective way to develop and maintain an adequate response capacity is through ongoing and regular review of staff performance against key security policies and practices. A dedicated, or at least identifiable, investigative review capacity is an important element in effectively managing prison incidents. It can alert people to a deficiency or the need for more training or better policies. In certain circumstances, it may prevent incidents from occurring.

5. Security response capacity

Contingency planning should provide staff, partners and the public with confidence that, if a major incident occurs, all available resources can be called upon to quickly and effectively intervene.

Contingency plans need to be developed based on detailed knowledge of the prison, staff and the type of prisoners detained. The ability to intervene on a large scale requires clear roles and responsibilities, and a clear and explicit reporting / command structure.

Prison staff and other security forces need to be trained, and the training refreshed, on a regular basis. Outside security forces that are called on to assist with prison security need to be familiarized with the prison layout, security systems in place, and the nature and extent of training that has been provided to prison staff.

6. Information sharing and awareness

Ongoing efforts to communicate and reinforce the activities of corrections advisors, although time consuming, is one of the best ways to generate understanding and support for a prison service.

In some countries, there seems to be a real reluctance by the prison service to invite members of outside groups in to visit prisons. Prisons are closed places that, by their very nature, are not well understood. Outside groups can obtain a better understanding of the challenges facing the prison service, and invitations to visit can attract new partnerships.

Media libraries are being developed or are already in place in a number of missions. These can be useful when communicating with others about work that is under way or needs that exist.

One of the key partners within the United Nations is the United Nations Police (UNPol). There is a need to nurture and sustain an ongoing relationship between UNPol and prisons, with the aim of information sharing and joint training.

7. Perimeter security – National Police

National police provide a valuable and essential function in those post-conflict countries where prisons are not secure. Their presence reassures the public and provides a capacity that does not exist within the prison service in the early stages of mission involvement.

Their rules of engagement are very clear and prescriptive, although their application and interpretation varies depending on the situation. In certain cases, however, national police have little knowledge of or involvement with prisons, and are unaware of the profile of prisoners or the level of prison staff training.

That said, they can provide a critical capacity to prevent escapes and ensure the integrity of the perimeter of a prison.

In some locations, national police provide a very active security presence and patrol the exterior of prisons on a regular and consistent basis. In some prisons, they are also called upon to assist in prisoner escorts, searching or responding to serious / major incidents.

National police may rotate frequently, which can limit their ability to accumulate an appreciation of the risks that may develop over time, as the prisoner profile changes or tension and anxiety mount within a prison.

Co-location of national police within a prison is not a desirable practice due to vulnerabilities that could exist if prisoners were to take their weapons. Many prison services will not allow firearms into prison areas.

There would be some benefit in exploring opportunities for joint training and capacity-building involving national police and prison staff, where these are not already in place.

B. Lessons learned and recommendations from DPKO Corrections Advisors

The following recommendations are the result of observations by experienced corrections advisors during mission visits. They are suggested courses of action related to good order and control in the management of prison security, and may or may not apply to every situation in every country.

Capacity-building

1. Specific strategies need to be in place to build and then sustain a strong relationship with prison authorities to ensure they embrace all legislative requirements and operating procedures relating to prison security. Particular attention needs to be paid to the risks for woman prisoners, juveniles and other vulnerable groups.

Focused activities to support capacity-building could include:

- weekly coordination meetings with a forward-looking agenda with specific areas to be addressed (searching, prisoner movement, perimeter inspections and security patrols, visitors, counting, incident review, training, contingency planning, etc.)
 - regular meetings between the prison director and the chief of the corrections advisors to share all incident-related information and their resolution as well as observations made
 - a quarterly review of operational security highlights within the corrections advisors to identify common themes and recurring challenges
 - identification and establishment of a senior prison official at prison headquarters responsible for women prisoners' security
 - briefings with the prison administration on the United Nations rules for the treatment of women prisoners ("Bangkok Rules", October 2010). These rules highlight the heightened vulnerability and special needs of women prisoners
 - embedding of a corrections advisor into a prison headquarters operation
 - preparation of a summary of the impact of prolonged and arbitrary detention including a projection of the impact on prisons
 - establishment of "Detention Review Committees" to identify prisoners whose legal status / detention provisions need to be reviewed / revised
2. Support the prison service in the preparation of formal budget submissions with specific emphasis on security infrastructure, related equipment and training. This could include:
 - conducting a review of existing security needs and related costs
 - creating a budget submission template consistent with government financial processes
 - developing with the prison service a matrix that links security needs to international standards, the priorities of the prison service and government's priorities related to public safety
 - developing a strategic planning document to support and reinforce the resource requirements of the prison service with a focus on essential security elements and their relationship to international standards
 - reviewing financial information to establish specific cost indicators as these relate to security, staff, health care, equipment, training, etc.

- introducing a set of performance indicators so the prison service can demonstrate where improvements are occurring and identify emerging issues and challenges
3. The existing corrections advisors' logistic capacity to support an active presence and enhance capacity at key prisons varies in missions, but is often not sufficient to fulfil their mandate (e.g., vehicles, office space, staffing processes – Government Provided Personnel [GPPs] at the mission level).
 4. The inclusion of an experienced prison engineer is as essential as a corrections advisor. Their key responsibilities should include:
 - ensure that all specifications detailed in infrastructure projects comply with international prison security standards and construction codes
 - coordinate and monitor mission-funded projects, such as Quick Impact Projects (QIPs). Large-scale construction / renovation projects are usually managed and monitored by the United Nations Office for Project Services (UNOPS)
 - develop proposals to address deficiencies
 - ensure that, once each project work is completed, it is signed off with all the relevant parties
 5. Measure / evaluate to what extent corrections advisors' knowledge and skills are being transferred to prison counterparts. This should include:
 - identifying specific security-related areas where knowledge and information have been provided
 - determining the degree of retention of this information by prison staff
 - assessing the nature and extent of the daily application of the knowledge (skills acquisition)
 - evaluating the ability to adapt knowledge and apply it in different daily scenarios
 - identifying the extent to which knowledge is used in making decisions.
 6. Corrections advisors should support the prison service in introducing a self-assessment tool to assess compliance with security-related procedures. This tool should cover:
 - knowledge and interpretation of security-related procedures
 - frequency of application
 - prerequisite / essential training
 - corrective measures or consequences when non-compliance is identified
 7. A national prison service "code of conduct" needs to be in place to support the professionalism of staff and assist in the daily operation of prisons.

8. There is a need to establish accountability measures when there is blatant non-compliance by prison staff with key operational policies or procedures. They should include:
 - developing the scope and mandate for a personnel review committee
 - establishing a range of sanctions and / or remedial options to be considered when non-compliance is identified
 - integrating the “code of conduct” into training programmes, present as a distinct training module for each employee during induction training, and reinforce at each prison at least every year
 - developing a specific supervision module for each prison service supervisor
 - assisting the prison service in introducing staff performance reviews for security incidents needing corrective or remedial action
 - proposing a self-reporting / self-assessment compliance checklist that staff would complete

Security policies and procedures

9. Corrections advisors should ensure that the prison service has:
 - security design information and specifications related to all security infrastructure including walls, cell doors, watchtowers, main gate, etc.
 - a reliable and regular reporting system from each prison to headquarters
 - random visits to prisons from headquarters officials, inspection checklists linked to policies, standards and prison priorities
10. Prisons should adopt security approaches that address the identified vulnerabilities.
11. United Nations agencies involved in prison security projects should call upon the expertise of the Department of Peacekeeping Operations (DPKO) and the Criminal Law and Judicial Advisory Service (CLJAS), especially in the areas of infrastructure specifications, security policies and related training. This should include sharing DPKO, CLJAS and corrections advisors’ resource and guidance materials with key United Nations agencies at the mission level, including such publications as:
 - United Nations *Standard Minimum Rules for the Treatment of Prisoners*
 - International Corrections and Prisons Association for the Advancement of Professional Corrections (ICPA), *Practical Guidelines Manual for the Establishment of Correctional Services within United Nations Peace Operations*
 - International Centre for Prison Studies, *Guidance Notes on Prison Reform*

- United Nations, *Primer for Justice Components in Multidimensional Peace Operations: Strengthening the Rule of Law*
 - United Nations, *Supporting National Prison Systems: Lessons Learned and Best Practices for Peacekeeping Operations*
 - Rule of Law Network, Management Development Course, *Management of Prison Support Programmes in Peace Operations*
 - United Nations, *DPKO Guidelines for the Mapping and Assessment of Police and Other Law Enforcement Agencies, and Justice and Corrections Institutions in Post-Conflict Settings*
 - Office of the High Commissioner for Human Rights (OHCHR), *Human Rights and Prisons: Manual on Human Rights Training for Prison Officials*
12. DPKO should develop and provide to each mission where there are corrections advisors, a clear set of “static security” guidelines related to the repair, renovation and building of prisons. This should include at a minimum:
 - perimeter security specifications for different types of prisons (materials, construction, height, etc.)
 - security specifications related to cell doors, exercise yards, health-care centres, key control, armoury, escort vehicles, restraint equipment
 - minimum internal security requirements in those situations where women, juveniles and other vulnerable prisoner populations and men are co-located
 - essential security equipment, prerequisite training and issuance to staff
 - maintenance of all security systems and related equipment such as generators, lighting, security equipment
 - development and introduction of a static security checklist / assessment tool to be completed by each prison, including the identification of specific security vulnerabilities and efforts to mitigate the risk using dynamic security
 - focused training and mentoring on the relationships between static security and dynamic security
 13. When riot equipment is supplied, the prison service should:
 - ensure that the required training has been completed
 - identify staff to whom this equipment will be issued (once trained)
 - develop policy on access, storage and use of this equipment
 14. Introduce a daily routine involving key elements of dynamic security, focusing on contact between prisoners and prison staff (relationship building). This should include:

- regular security patrols
 - activity-based and / or increased officer / prisoner contact at specified times during the day, including increased attention / observation of the daily activities, behaviours and interactions between prisoners as well as with staff and visitors
 - develop a specific course / module on dynamic security for all prison staff and prison management
 - develop a self-assessment instrument to assist staff members in evaluating their dynamic security performance
15. Each prison service should introduce the requirement for:
 - daily security briefings to the prison director by the head of security
 - monthly security inspections of each prison
 - review of new prisoners, their charges / convictions and their security risk
 16. Each prison should reinforce the concept and practice of searching (search plans), including a gender perspective, and establish a regular routine for searching all parts of the prison. At a minimum, this should:
 - specify the frequency / randomness of the search, the area to be searched and the techniques to be used
 - indicate the circumstances and conditions under which an exceptional search can be conducted
 - identify conditions under which outside search staff can conduct searches
 - specify the way in which prisoners will be handled during searches of cells / living space
 - ensure recording (in a register), including the mode of disposal of all seized contraband
 17. Perimeter and interior security lighting to be installed. This lighting must clearly illuminate both the exterior and interior security perimeter of the prison and all entrances and exits.
 18. When security watchtowers are constructed, ensure that:
 - prisoners cannot easily access the towers
 - towers are located so as to provide a clear view of the perimeter of the prison and surrounding area
 - towers are equipped with a reliable means of communication (whistles are acceptable, but procedures should clearly specify when they are to be used)
 - a clear policy on the use of “lethal force” for those officers provided with firearms
 - towers are staffed at all times
 - where possible walkways are installed

Security training

19. The introduction of use of force training and a problem-solving framework need to be reinforced and supported on a continuing basis if their impact is to be recognized.
 - A detailed curriculum and a training package related to a use of force continuum and a problem-solving framework aimed at the successful resolution of serious prison incidents need to be developed.
20. Training of prison staff on self-defence and the use of force needs to be sustained and completed before a mission drawdown occurs. For the training investment to be realized, the prison service needs to ensure that staff members participate fully in training.

Security reviews and analysis – operational framework

21. Assist the prison in establishing a Prison Inspectorate function to monitor and assess each prison's compliance with national prison directives and procedures, and with international standards, and to identify gaps in security and investigate prison incidents. This work should include:
 - developing job descriptions and related prison policies including scope, jurisdiction and responsibilities
 - developing a checklist and guidelines for inspectors
 - identifying expertise to provide training to inspectors
 - creating a yearly report on the issues identified during the inspections; compliance with national prison directives and procedures, and with international standards related to prison security; and the actions taken
22. Develop a quarterly review by the prison administrator of incidents, staff involved, and measures taken by the prison director at each prison, and provide a copy to prison headquarters.
23. Develop country-relevant measurement criteria for each prison security element referenced in the United Nations *Planning Toolkit for Rule of Law and Security Institutions Personnel*, which assesses a prison service from different perspectives, including performance, integrity, transparency, accountability, treatment of vulnerable groups and capacity.

Basic security-related elements include:

- number of escapes
- violent deaths
- prison inspections
- records management

These elements are critical in the ongoing assessment of threats and risks of serious prison incidents. They should be further developed and used as a resource for corrections advisors in the ongoing assessment of progress being made in prison reform by a prison service.

24. Ensure daily security briefing sessions between prison authorities and perimeter security forces (police), where such forces exist.
25. Create a self-assessment tool to assess compliance with security-related elements and functions, such as main gate, guard towers, prisoner counts, exercise yards, patrols, searches, escorts, etc. This work should include:
 - developing checklists related to each of the prison procedures
 - creating a schedule for the regular review of procedures
26. Create a basic incident-reporting process to provide a better appreciation of incidents in prisons and the factors involved. This work should at a minimum include:
 - time and specific location of the incident
 - number of prisoners involved
 - harm caused
 - timing and quality of staff response
 - amount of force used
 - modifications required to prisoner security procedures (including training) as a result of the incident

Security response capacity – incident management

27. Develop prison-specific “contingency plans” to ensure the rapid deployment capacity required to deal with incidents of insecurity and instability within the prison. The plans should clearly delineate the relationship between procedures for responding to frequent minor incidents and a coordinated contingency plan to respond to major incidents. The latter plan should include:
 - how prison staff will communicate in an incident, evacuation points and how staff will continue performing duties, if possible
 - training of other support organizations, such as the police, local emergency response forces, fire services and hospitals, in terms of how to handle the duties of key prison staff members in the event that they are unable to perform
 - familiarization of emergency response forces with the physical layout of the prison and the number and type of prisoners being held
 - create a procedure on emergencies and emergency response capacity

28. Develop a contingency planning template. Contingency plans should have as their cornerstones, operational functionality, situational flexibility and action. The types of emergencies that should be addressed include:
- evacuation (e.g., fires)
 - hostage situation
 - riots
 - mass escapes
 - employee job action – labour unrest
 - natural disasters
 - large-scale medical emergencies
 - external threats (e.g., armed gangs)
29. Establish a situation-management model / problem-solving model that will guide a prison service at the time of a crisis or emergency. The model should include:
- who is involved in the incident and what role are they playing
 - what other information is important to know or to understand and analyse the situation
 - who needs to be involved to successfully resolve the conflict
 - what response options can be considered
 - what are the likely consequences of these options
 - reporting and notifications
31. Develop a self-assessment tool to assess compliance with prison procedures related to key security functions. It should include:
- a checklist that is subject-specific (searches, use of force, etc.) and that can be reviewed and completed by prison staff and prison management
 - a schedule to ensure all key prison procedures and policies are reviewed regularly

Information sharing and awareness

32. Corrections advisors should liaise with United Nations services at the mission to communicate and reinforce progress made in prison security. This work can include:
- communicating existing Quick Impact Projects (QIPs) to donors, United Nations partners and stakeholders
 - regular meetings to identify stories of interest or announcements
 - invitations to prisons for a greater sharing of knowledge

- creating a media library of security images (infrastructure, equipment and security training) to facilitate media stories and announcements
 - creating a priorities / issues/challenges document aimed at existing and prospective donors
 - exploring possibilities for greater use of technology. including podcasts and information on a mission website
33. Initiate regular updates to prospective donors. This should be done by way of:
 - a quarterly newsletter
 - a short summary of the scope, impact and value of recent investments
 - meetings or contact with prospective donors / supporters
 34. Prison visits should be offered to foreign governments, United Nations agencies, local and national government departments, international and national non-governmental organizations (INGOs / NGOs), civil society, faith-based organizations, etc., to develop enhanced contacts and longer-term relationships.
 35. Establish a systematic and ongoing process for sharing prison reports between the United Nations Police (UNPol) and corrections advisors.

C. Lessons learned from the missions visited

1. Perimeter security

In many prisons, staff members tend to over-rely on the physical perimeter wall as the main security element without paying due attention to the role of staff and observation in monitoring the integrity of the security perimeter and identifying threats. In some cases, the perimeter is in need of repair and is deteriorating to such an extent that its integrity is questionable. Foundations are exposed, walls are infiltrated with water and repairs are often poorly done.

The corridor next to the exterior security perimeter is often narrow or non-existent due to the proximity of neighbouring buildings or, in some cases, activities that are regularly conducted in the area, such as markets and parking of non-prison vehicles. Trees within the prison compound are sometimes located too close to the perimeter security wall, as is the case with some buildings located in the prison or outside the perimeter wall.

An inside perimeter corridor for patrols can ensure the principal perimeter wall is intact and prisoners are not allowed to congregate near the perimeter wall. Staff should not leave items in this corridor. This corridor allows staff to respond to incidents and attempted escapes in a more timely fashion.

Exercise yards should not be located near any exterior perimeter wall and the view of the yard should not be obstructed by anything, including trees or other items that restrict the ability of staff to continuously observe prisoners.

Security towers are often not staffed at critical times and, in some prisons, are accessible to prisoners. They have been used by prisoners to gain access to the top of the perimeter wall and escape quickly without difficulty. A safe exit needs to be provided for the security tower officers in times of extreme danger. Where possible, walkways connected to the security towers should also form part of the security perimeter infrastructure. At many sites, where concertina wire is installed on walls, it is poorly anchored and has lost its effectiveness in preventing escapes. In some prisons, prisoners use the concertina wire to dry cloths.

There are neither consistently applied maintenance routines nor checklists related to key security elements in prisons, especially in relation to perimeter security.

In those prisons where national police are involved, the application and interpretation of their rules of engagement vary from one prison to another, as does their knowledge of correctional environments. The rules of engagement and presence of national police need to be assessed and reassessed as the respective prison service increases or decreases its capacity to manage major prison incidents.

2. Security infrastructure and static security

A clear set of recognized and easily understood security standards and specifications should be developed to guide donors, contractors, United Nations agencies and prison services.

Many prisons have a number of challenges and deficiencies in this area. They include rusting cell doors without proper hinge systems and inadequate / unprotected locking mechanisms. Prisoners can, in some cases, have easy access to locks because of the lack of protective plates or an ability to easily grab the prison officer as they lock or unlock the cell. In some prisons, the cell doors are solid except for a small window. This does not allow the prison officer to properly observe the cell.

The security barriers that should be used to isolate and / or contain prisoners in a certain part of the prison are either non-existent or in poor condition. Open hinges on cell doors or security barriers can allow prisoners to remove doors, thereby compromising any containment strategies.

Systems for the storage and retrieval of locks are inconsistent; in some prisons, locks are left hanging on cell doors, easily accessible to prisoners should they decide to use them as weapons or to lock prison staff up.

Key control systems also vary widely and in many cases are not reliable for responding to an incident. Documentation concerning keys and locks, their location and accessibility, and related protocols (rotation / storage of locks) are inconsistent. Key accessibility and distribution is inconsistent, and it is unclear if a prison could be evacuated quickly in the case of fire or other emergency.

The armoury in a prison stores specialized security equipment. Where this type of equipment exists, its location, storage and access represent an area of concern from several different perspectives (security, condition of the equipment, control and access, etc.). Prisons need to augment their capacity to intervene or control a situation through the provision and use of specialized security equipment.

In some prisons, restraint equipment, specifically leg restraints, are still being used for extended periods for prisoners identified as high risk, or where the perimeter of the prison is not secure or is non-existent. Restraint should not be used in situations where prisoners are locked in their cells all day. However, it may be necessary to use restraint equipment to ensure a minimum degree of freedom of movement within a prison. This is not acceptable, except as a last resort and as a short-term measure only.

In some prisons, the installation of water reservoirs and other equipment is done without adequate attention to security. These structures can be used by prisoners to facilitate escapes or create blind spots for prison staff.

During some prison disturbances, prisoners have been able to access and destroy files. The secure storage of prisoner files in locked drawers or cabinets is important. These files should only be accessible to certain staff members and not to prisoners. A set of backup files containing basic information on each prisoner needs to be stored securely, preferably off site.

The secure storage of medical supplies is equally important. Dangerous drugs should be stored separately from other medications, preferably at a different and more secure location.

Special attention needs to be given to the installation of bunk beds in higher-security prisons. Unfortunately, they are often constructed in a manner in which they can be easily disassembled and used as weapons or escape implements. They should be securely welded together and secured to the floor so they cannot be used to access cellblock roofs, etc.

The management of seized items and contraband needs to be clearly established in operational policy. A register should be established to record all seized items and the mode of disposal clearly entered in the register. Prisoners will become aggravated if they see seized items being used by staff or re-appearing in the prison. These items can also present a security risk.

Critical operational systems such as generator and water / electrical system control panels need to be located and protected in areas not accessible by prisoners and in an area where servicing and maintenance is easy to provide. Electrical and water supply lines need to be properly labelled. Staff members need to be able to control these systems to prevent flooding, control fires and shut off power during certain situations if required during prison incidents.

It is important to have an alternative power source for security lighting (e.g. generators, solar panels, etc.), as well as to ensure the provision of water in prisons where the town power source is unreliable.

There is no consistent standard related to toilets in prisons. Porcelain sit-down toilets with exposed water tanks are easy to break and need considerable maintenance. Squat toilets, commonly known as “Turkish toilets”, require less maintenance and do not allow dismantling or the use of parts as weapons.

Infrastructure assessment guides and checklists, where they exist, are an important resource to identify vulnerabilities and set priorities for construction and repair.

3. Capacity-building

Capacity-building is a conceptual approach to development that focuses on understanding the obstacles that inhibit people, governments, international organizations and non-governmental organizations from realizing their developmental goals while enhancing the abilities that will allow them to achieve measurable and sustainable results.

The focused and ongoing efforts of corrections advisors is critical to capacity-building efforts. A key area that remains a challenge is to develop an assessment tool that can be used to measure the impact of advisors in terms of sustainable capacity development. Often the prison service will revert to its previous routines and operational practices once the advisors leave. The knowledge transfer that has occurred, and new skills and practices that have been established in policies, need to be applied and reinforced on a regular basis.

In some missions, weekly / monthly reporting is used as a mechanism to continuously evaluate the capacity development efforts of advisors. The recent introduction of the Rule of Law Performance Indicators Project (ROLIP) also contributes to the assessment. Consistent documentation is the key to accurately assessing actual performance.

In some prisons, operational policies are posted in key locations. In this way, prison staff members are constantly reminded of their responsibilities. The posting of key security policies in key locations is a straightforward and visual way of reinforcing policy.

Prisoner and staff handbooks are a straightforward and effective way of providing direction, education and accountability. A staff handbook that clearly outlines performance

expectations and competencies required for prison staff provides a clear context in which staff can be more effectively supervised and held accountable.

A similar type of handbook for prisoners outlining their rights and responsibilities and describing prison routines helps to guide behaviour, as well as outline consequences. When both staff and prisoners know what is expected of them and how a normal day in the prison should unfold, the quality of interaction for all is more predictable and less provocative allowing rules to be enforced without prisoners suggesting they were not aware of them.

The United Nations Development Programme offers a 5–step process for systematic capacity-building. The steps are:

- i. **Engage stakeholders in capacity development.** An effective capacity-building process must encourage participation by all those involved. If stakeholders are involved and share ownership in the process of development they will feel more responsible for the outcome and sustainability of the development. Engaging stakeholders who are directly affected by the situation allows for more effective decision-making; it also makes development work more transparent.
- ii. **Assess capacity needs and assets.** Assessing pre-existing capacities through engagement with stakeholders allows capacity builders to see what areas require additional training, what areas should be prioritized, and in what ways capacity-building can be incorporated into local and institutional development strategies. Capacity-building that is not rooted in a comprehensive study and assessment of the pre-existing conditions will be restricted to training alone, which will not facilitate sustained results.
- iii. **Formulate a capacity development response.** Once an assessment has been completed, a capacity-building response must be created based on four core issues:
 - a. **Institutional arrangements.** Assessments often find that institutions are inefficient because of bad or weak policies, procedures, resource management, organization, leadership, frameworks and communication. Human resources frameworks require policies and procedures for recruitment, deployment and transfer; incentives systems for staff; skills development; performance evaluation systems; and ethics and values codes.
 - b. **Leadership.** Leadership by either an individual or an organization can act as a catalyst to achieve development objectives. Strong leadership allows for easier adaptation to changes; strong leaders can also influence people. Coaching and mentoring programmes should be aimed at the development of leadership skills such as priority setting, communication, operational performance and strategic planning.
 - c. **Knowledge.** Knowledge is the foundation of capacity. Substantial investments need be made in establishing strong education systems, and opportunities

for continued learning and the development of professional skills for staff and managers.

- d. **Accountability.** The implementation of accountability measures facilitates better performance and efficiency. A lack of accountability measures in prisons allows for the proliferation of corruption. Corrections advisors should focus on strengthening accountability frameworks that monitor and evaluate the prisons. They should also promote the involvement of independent organizations that can oversee, monitor and evaluate these institutions.
- iv. **Implement a capacity development response.** Implementing a capacity-building programme should involve the inclusion of multiple systems (national, local and institutional). Implementation should involve continual reassessment and expectations of change as situations change. It should incorporate evaluative indicators to measure the effectiveness of programmes that have been initiated.
- v. **Evaluate capacity development.** Evaluation of capacity-building promotes accountability. Measurements should be based on changes in an institutions performance. Evaluations should be based four main issues: institutional arrangements, leadership, knowledge, and accountability.

4. Women, juveniles and other vulnerable prisoners

As each prison service progresses, there needs to be an increased capacity to separate vulnerable prisoners from other prisoners in line with international human rights and standards for prisons. Key policies and operational practices concerning access, security procedures and contingency plans need to be put in place to ensure vulnerable groups can be safely and securely housed in a prison.

Having separate prisons for women, juveniles and other vulnerable groups may be the ultimate solution, but results in these prisoners often being placed some distance from their families and support networks.

5. Counts, searches, patrols and escorts

In many prisons, the capacity to effectively and regularly count prisoners is affected by high numbers of prisoners, the availability of staff, and the physical condition and layout of the prison. Where there are large numbers of prisoners in one large cell, with little way of identification, it is difficult to accurately verify the presence of specific prisoners.

Record keeping and count boards located within the sections of the prison become an important management tool for staff.

The ability of staff to search all areas of the prison on a regular basis is affected by the number of prisoners in each cell, their time out of the cell and the storage of personal effects in the cell.

The inability of staff members to search parts of the prison also affects their ability to identify infrastructure or static security features that need repair or have been tampered with. Without regular and complete searches, prisoners can hide and accumulate a wide variety of items, some of which may help facilitate escapes or assaults on other prisoners, prison staff or visitors.

Security patrols provide security staff with an opportunity to have frequent contact with prisoners as well to obtain information, and more closely observe prisoner activities and relationships. They demonstrate to prisoners that staff members are actively concerned about their safety and well-being, and are vigilant in maintaining the security of the prison.

With respect to all of the above, if prison staff members are passive and inactive, the likelihood of incidents occurring can increase dramatically. Prisoners can also exert unreasonable amounts of control over other prisoners and conduct activities that can ultimately compromise the security of the prison and the safety of staff and other prisoners.

Prison directors are key agents of change in these circumstances, and need to actively and firmly insist that staff conduct key security activities, if for no other reason than that of their own safety.

In some prison services, more attention needs to be paid to the escorting procedures, especially when a number of escapes have occurred. Operational procedures need to clearly describe, in detail, the process to be followed when a prisoner escapes or fails to return to prison.

6. Contingency plans, crisis management policies and training

In many prisons, there is little capacity to develop detailed contingency plans because of limited outside resources and internal capacity. This does not, however, negate the importance of having clear direction and detailed roles and responsibilities, agreed to by all concerned.

Mechanisms to identify and differentiate prisoners quickly and visually from prison staff or visitors are important in managing a prisoner population and responding to incidents. They help to determine the safest and most effective ways of resolving an incident.

Staff identification is equally important. This becomes critical when a staff member's behaviour is questionable, when trying to identify key witnesses to an incident or during a hostage taking.

Each prison needs to have a well-established and well-understood crisis intervention framework to guide staff and management. A number of fundamental rules and guidelines need to be in place so staff can move quickly and effectively when an incident or crisis occurs. Normally these are infrequent events, which underscores the importance of having distinct policies in place for different types of crisis, along with training, refresher courses, simulations and effective partnerships. The concept of “operational adjustment” needs to be introduced to provide a model and process that can apply when the number of staff is insufficient. This term refers to a repositioning of staff to key security posts when there are not enough staff members to support all of the prison’s activity.

Emergency response teams need to be familiar with the physical layout of the prison, and the number and type of prisoners. Orientation to the prison and practice through simulation exercises need to be conducted.

7. Recruitment, staff selection and supervision

In many post-conflict countries, the majority of prison staff is comprised of members from a military or police background. They often bring with them a preconceived set of assumptions and approaches in terms of prisoners and how to interact with them. The initial selection and subsequent core training of staff provide opportunities to identify areas of deficiency and / or where a change in values and attitude may be required.

Active supervision of prison staff is also an important element in improving staff performance, but corrections advisors need to exercise caution that their coaching and mentoring focus does not become a replacement or substitute for the supervision and direction that prison staff should be receiving from their supervisors.

The review of incidents provides a valuable opportunity to identify weaknesses in policies, operational practices and staff performance. Supervisors should also remember to reinforce good performance identified during an incident review.

8. Dynamic security

One of the key areas e prisons need to focus on is dynamic security. Relationships should be viewed as the cornerstone of any effective prison system. Taking an active and genuine interest in a prisoner as an individual and in their well-being provides the basis for a respectful relationship where the balance of power, control and justice are all present. This relationship and active interaction also provide the essential platform for demonstrating a respect for human rights and the rule of law. Staff members need to be trained in communication skills, and in both conflict resolution and problem solving.

9. Self-defence and the use of force

If prison staff members are expected to interact with prisoners on a frequent basis, and to deal with conflict and aggressive behaviour, they need to be confident they have the tools, authority and processes to deal appropriately with a variety of situations.

All this depends on their ability to feel comfortable in an often emotionally charged, sometimes threatening and frequently risky environment. They need to rely on self-defence and use of force training and that of their colleagues when intervening with prisoners or carrying out their duties. They can then rest confident that the amount of force they are using is sanctioned and approved by the prison authorities.

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